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Since the early 1960's, the scholarly commentary concerning the
relative rights of a trustee in bankruptcy' and the rights of a reclaim-
ing seller under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code' has been
characterized by intense debate. 3 This conflict has arisen primarily
*Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business Administration, Univer-
sity of North Carolina.
**Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University.
This article deals with the provisions of the present Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C.
§§ 1 et seq. (1970) (amended in 1972 and 1975). The reader should note that Congress
is presently considering several proposed revisions of the Act which, if passed, could
substantially alter much of the discussion in this article. For a general description of
these proposals, see Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill and the fudge's Bill for
the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 Au. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1975).
2 All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code are based upon the 1972 Official
Text unless otherwise noted.
3 See, e.g., Ashe, Reclamation Under UCC—An Exercise in Futility: Defrauded Seller v.
Trustee in Bankruptcy, 43 REF. J. 78 (1969); Bjornstad Reclamation of Goads by Unsecured
Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 DRAKE L. Rev. 357 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Bjornstad]; Braucher, Reclamation of Cowls from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 Micii. L. Rev.
1281 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Braucher]; Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in
Bankruptcy, 1 N.M. L. REV. 435 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Countryman]; Hawkland,
The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and Defrauded Sellers—Amending the Uniform Commercial
Code to Conform. to the Kravitz Case, 67 Cou. L.J. 86 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Hawkland]; Henson, Reclamation Rights- of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Henson]; Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller under
Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus, LAW. 833 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy]; King,
Voidable Preferences and the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CORNELL L.Q, 925 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as King-Voidable Preferences]; King, Reclamation Petition Granted: In De-
fense of the Defrauded Seller, 44 REF, J. 81 (1970) [hereinafter cited as King]; Shanker,
Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Wiliam Commercial Code, 40 Rm .]. 37 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Shanker); Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of U.C.C. Section 2-702(3):
Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs, Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. REs. L. REV.
93 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Shanker-Reply]; Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of' the
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from the problems presented when a buyer receives goods on credit
and then enters into bankruptcy. The seller clearly wishes to reclaim
the goods or to obtain their value from the buyer. However, the trus-
tee in bankruptcy typically will oppose the seller's claim in accordance
with his duty under the Bankruptcy Act to collect and reduce to
money the property of the bankrupt buyer.' The failure of the courts
and the commentators to reach a consensus on whether the seller or
trustee should receive priority is to some extent a consequence of the
Uniform Commercial Code's intrusion into this area, particularly by
the language of U.C.C. section 2-702 which permits a credit seller to
reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer. 5 Even more significantly, this
lack of consensus reflects an intractable underlying policy conflict be-
tween the seller's interests and those of the bankruptcy trustee, 8 a
conflict which is exacerbated by the tangible financial consequences of
policies favoring either party.'
This article does not seek to provide a resolution of the difficul-
ties facing a seller who attempts to reclaim property from a bankrupt
buyer. Rather, it will attempt to elucidate both the strategies available
to the reclaiming seller and the potential legal obstacles he may con-
front in utilizing each strategy. Because the Bankruptcy Act's treat-
ment of the reclaiming seller is largely determined by the characteri-
zation of the seller's rights under the common law and the Code, this
article will first consider the pre-Code remedies traditionally available
to the credit seller when reclaiming from an insolvent buyer. It will
then examine the prerequisites necessary to assert reclamation rights
under the Uniform Commercial Code. The article will next explore
the applicable Bankruptcy Act sections within the context of the op-
tions or strategies available to the reclaiming seller. These options are
organized in reverse chronological sequence beginning with the basic
Uniform Commercial Code: The Right to Recover the Goods Upon Insolvency, 79 HARV. L. REY.
598 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, 79 HARV. L.. REV.] See also R. DUESENBERC & L.
KING. SALES & BULK 'TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13.03[4]
(1966) [hereinafter cited as DuEsENBERG. & KiNo]; R. NoRDsTRoNI, HANTHlooK or THE
LAW OF SALES, ## 167.69 (1970); 'WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF Tun LASS' UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE § 7-15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS).
Further, volumes 3, 3A, 4, and 4A of COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (rev'd 14th ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as CoLLIER] contain considerable material bearing upon this problem.
4 See II U.S.C. §§ 75, 110 (1970).
5 See notes 30-47 infra and accompanying text.
° Typically, a seller who has sold goods on credit would prefer to protect his busi-
ness interests by reclaiming the goods if the buyer defaults. Absent such protection a
seller would be reluctant to transfer property to a buyer before the purchase price is
paid. This would discourage the extension of credit or acceptance of checks as a means
of payment and consequently would interfere with the flow of commerce. Conversely,
the bankruptcy trustee is under a duty to protect the property of the bankrupt and to
insure the fair distribution of assets to creditors. See note 4 supra and accompanying
text. If the property in question has become part of the bankrupt's estate then the re-
claiming seller should receive no better treatment than that given general creditors.
See, e.g., Henson, supra note 3, at 51 n.37, who concludes from official 1969
statistics that the unsecured creditor (e.g., a 2-702 reclaimant who could not prevail
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situation which has generated almost all the litigation regarding sec-
tion 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act:
the case where the seller delivers goods on credit to a buyer who is
unable to pay, discovers the buyer's insolvency only upon his bank-
ruptcy, and attempts to reclaim the goods from the trustee after the
date of the petition. The article will next examine the credit seller's
chances for success if he manages to discover the buyer's insolvency
and effect a reclamation before the date of bankruptcy. The article will
close with a discussion of the efficacy of a host of other Code options
relevant to the pre-bankruptcy period: refusal of delivery except for
cash under section 2-702(1); stoppage in transit under section 2-705;
reservation of title to the goods; and, finally, perfection of an Article
9 security interest.
1. SECTION 2-702, ITS ANTECEDENTS, AND ITS POSSIBLE
CHARACTERIZATIONS
The Bankruptcy Act does not specifically refer to the rights of a
reclaiming seller in those provisions which deal with the distribution
of the bankrupt's estate. Therefore, the choice of the appropriate Act
provision depends upon the characterization of the 2-702(2) right to
reclaim. For example, section 67c(1)(A) of the Act provides that
"every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency
of the debtor" will be "invalid against the trustee." The language of
this section is relevant when compared to U.C.C. section 2-702(2)
which permits a credit seller to reclaim goods from an insolvent
buyer.° If the seller's right to reclaim under section 2-702(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code is characterized as a statutory lien, then
the trustee can obviously invalidate any such reclamation under sec-
tion 67c(1)(A)." However, section 2-702 may also be viewed as a
codification of a common law right of reclamation and, as such, would
not constitute a statutory lien." Such a characterization would thus
deny a trustee the right to invalidate a reclamation under section
67c(1)(A).
As will be seen later in this article, similar problems of charac-
terization exist in interpreting several other Bankruptcy Act
provisions." For this reason it is important first to examine the rights
of a seller to reclaim under the common law and the requisites for re-
clamation under section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
This examination will show that while the characterization of section
2-702 will often be crucial to a determination of priorities under the
against the trustee) "in an average asset case would receive less than eight cents per dol-
lar claimed, and about 90 percent of all bankruptcies arc no-asset cases."
" I I U.S.C.	 107(c)(l)(A) (1970). Section 67c(I)(A) is discussed at notes 100-26
infra.
" Section '2-702(2) is quoted in the text at note 32 infra.
See notes 100-26 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 105-09 infra and accompanying text.
' 2 See notes 68.264 infra and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy Act, there is little consensus as to what the proper charac-
terization should be.
A. Pre-Code Remedies
At common law, the unpaid credit seller had recourse to a
number of options against the buyer, including an action for the
price." However, an action for price in an insolvency proceeding was
of little use to the seller, since by implication the buyer was unable to
pay his debts. A more important remedy was found in the use of a
theory of rescission based upon fraud" where the seller could some-
times effect a return of the goods sold. Under this remedy, the buyer
was deemed to have taken only a voidable title, and the parties were
to be restored to their original pre-contractual position by all equitable
operation in which full title to the goods was viewed as never having
passed from the seller.' 5 Still, the buyer's taking of voidable title was
sufficient to enable him to pass full title to a good faith purchaser for
value, against whom the seller could not triumph." As a general rule,
the rescinding seller did have rights superior to those of an attaching
lien creditor." Furthermore, the seller's right to rescind and reclaim
was not disturbed by an intervening bankruptcy of the debtor, be-
cause the trustee was deemed to have taken title to the bankrupt's
property subject to the retroactive divestment effected by such a
rescission. 18
Subject to many state-to-state differences, there seem to have
been two basic situations giving rise to the seller's common law right
of rescission for fraud." The first of these was where the buyer re-
ceived the goods not intending to pay for them. 2 ° This intent could be
proved by several methods, 21 including proof of the buyer's insol-
vency upon receipt of the goods.22 However, the buyer's insolvency
was usually considered only presumptive as to the existence of intent
"See 3 WILLISTON ON SALES § 561 (rev'd ed. 1948).
" See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE. LAW OF SALES 397 (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter
cited as Vot.n]; 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 45-51 (1952).
"See, e.g., Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057, 1059-60 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore]; Vot.li,supra note 14, at 397-98.
"See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 15, at 1060; VoLo,supra note 14, at 400.
"See, e.g., Jones v. H.M. Hobbie Grocery Co., 246 F. 431, 433 (1917).
" See, e.g., Fisher v. Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159 (D. Mass. 1925);
Mulroney Mfg. Co. v. Weeks, 185 Iowa 714, 171 N.W. 36 (1919). See generally Annot.,
59 A.L.R. 418 (1929).
12
 For cases explicitly making this distinction between the two approaches, see
O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d I, 5 (8th Cir. 1961); Manly v. Ohio Shoe
Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928). See also 3 WILLISTON ON SALES H 623 et seq. (rev'd
ed. 1948); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418 (1929).
"See, e.g., O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1961); 77
C.J.S. Sales § 50 (1952).
" See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418, 426-28 (1929).
22 See, e.g., California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir.
1933); In re Henry Siegel Co., 223 F. 369 (D. Mass. 1915).
612
THE RECLAIMING SELLER AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
to defraud,23
 and this presumption could be overcome by proof that
the buyer had in good faith intended to pay for the goods and had a
reasonable basis for believing in his ability to do so. 24 The second
situation establishing the right of rescission arose where the buyer
made material, false representations as to his financial situation,
thereby inducing the seller to part with the goods." In this instance,
the misrepresentation need not have been intentional." However, the
fraudulent statement had to be a representation of present fact, and
not an expression of opinion, promise, or belief." The courts in some
instances also required that the seller show reliance on the
misrepresentation" and that such reliance was reasonable under the
circumstances."
B. A Credit Seller's RemedieS Under the Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code provides an unpaid credit seller
with a variety of remedies which are catalogued in section 2-703. 3°
However, after the goods have been delivered the seller has far fewer
remedies available. These include an action for the price under sec-
tion 2-709 and possibly for incidental damages under section 2-710. 3 '
" In re Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115 (D. Mass. 1928).
"E.g., In re Empire Grocery Co., 277 F. 73 (D. Mass. 1921); 77 C.J.S. Sates § 51
(1952). Where the buyer honestly intended to pay but had no reasonable basis for ex-
pecting to be able to do so, the seller typically was able to rescind. See In re Gurviu, 276
F. 931, 932 (D. Mass. 1921).
" See In re Indiana Concrete Pipe Co., 33 F.2d 594, 595-96 (N.D. Ind. 1929); 3
WILLISTON ON SALES § 636 (rev'd ed. 1948); Annot., 59
	 418, 418-24 (1929).
2 ° E.g., Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir, 1928).
22 See, r.g., VoLD, supra note 14, at 399-400; 77 C.J.S. Sales fi§ 46, 48 (1952).
" See, e.g., 77 C.J.S. Sales § 48 (1952). However, there was often some disagree-
ment as to the degree of reliance required. Compare, O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson
Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5, 8-9 (8th Cir. 1961) with National Shawmut Bank v. Johnson, 317
Mass. 485, 490, 58 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1945).
2"
 The reliance was sometimes expressed in terms of the duty to inquire as to the
buyer's financial status. See, e.g., Wead v. Ganzhorn, 249 N.W. 271, 272-73 (Iowa 1933);
77 C.J.S. Sales § 48, at 684 (1952).
U.C.C. § 2-703 provides;
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods
or fails to make a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with
respect to a part or the whole, then with respect to any goods directly af-
fected and, if' the breach is of the whole contract (Section 2-6 12), then also
with respect to the whole undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided (Section 2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified to
the contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Section 2-706);
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708) or in a proper
case the price (Section 2-709);
(I) cancel.
" U.C.C. § 2-709 states that "IwIllen a buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes
due the seller may recover, together with any incidental damages under [§ 2-7101, the
price ... of goods accepted...."
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However, in order to recover the specific goods sold, the seller must
proceed under section 2-702(2), which provides that:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received
goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods
upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if
misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particu-
lar seller in writing within three months before delivery the
ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in
this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim
goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresenta-
tion of solvency or intent to pay. 32
This reclamation right, as at common law," is expressly subordinated
to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith pur-
chaser by section 2-702(3) of the current Code. 34
Section 2-702(2) presents a number of technical requirements
necessary for the obtaining of the reclamation right. First, the seller
must discover that the buyer received the goods while insolvent, an
insolvent party being defined by section 1-201(23) as one "who either
has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or can-
not pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the mean-
ing of the federal bankruptcy law." Second, unless there is a written
misrepresentation of solvency within three months of delivery, the sel-
ler must demand the goods within ten days of their receipt by the
buyer. This ten day period has been held to run from the day after
the goods have been received until the tenth day after such receipt."
While it is not specifically mentioned in section 2-702, it can be
reasonably assumed that actual physical repossession of the goods
within the ten day period is not required." However, the cases di-
verge as to what minimum action must be taken by the seller. One
case has suggested in dictum that "an act of demanding or asking"
may be enough." Another, again in dictum, seems to have regarded a
telephone call as sufficient. 3" However, some cases have treated a bare
oral demand as inadequate, and have stated that some sort of
"follow-up" to regain possession is required. 39 Since the courts have
32 U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
33 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
34 The 1962 version of section 2-702(3) also subordinated the seller to the rights
of a lien creditor. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
It should be noted that the present version of § 2-702(3) also provides that
"(sluccessful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them."
33 In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (deci-
sion of bankruptcy referee).
"See, e.g., WiirrE & Summits, supra note 3, at 242.
37 In re Childress, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 505, 507 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (decision of
bankruptcy judge).
" Metropolitan Distribs. v, Eastern Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 128, 134, 1
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 154, 158 (C.P. Allegheny Co. 1959).
33 in re Collacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974) (the
court inferred that a demand under § 2-702(2) meant "a regaining of possession or a
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failed to provide any clear guidance as to what constitutes a sufficient
act of reclamation under section 2-702, it would be advisable for the
reclaiming seller to make an immediate oral demand followed by the
delivery of a written demand to the buyer. The seller should then at-
tempt to make a peaceful physical repossession" as soon as possible,
in order to protect his rights.
Section 2-702(2) further provides that the ten day limitation does
not apply "if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to a par-
ticular seller in writing within three months before delivery.' Com-
ment 2 to U.C.C. section 2-702 states that, for the exception to oper-
ate, "the statement of solvency must be in writing, addressed to the
particular seller and dated within three months of the delivery. "4 2
 I n
attempting to define the scope of a "writing" the courts have generally
held that a check may act as a misrepresentation of solvency,' but
have found insufficient such statements as a signed purchase order"
bona fide attempt to do so."); In re Behring	 Behring, 5 U.G.G. Rep. Serv. 600, 606
(N.D. Tex. 1968) (decision of bankruptcy referee). The referee in Behring stated:
I am nut prepared to say that the actual regaining of possession of the
goods is required to constitute the exercise of a right of reclamation, but it
seems to me that something more is required than a bare oral demand,
which is not followed up by any type of legal action or effort to regain
peaceable repossession without legal action.
5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 606. The court went on to suggest that a petition for reclamation
in a bankruptcy proceeding might be considered a suitable "follow up" of the oral de-
mand. Id. See note 160 infra.
The court in Behring did not locution where it had derived the "follow up" re-
quirement. In addition § 2-702 does not contain any language that would support the
requirement. However, it is conceivable that the language was derived front § 2-507
Comment 3. Section 2-507, which deals with cash sales, provides that "[w]here payment
is due and demanded on delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right
as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the
payment due." U.C.C. * 2-507(2). Official Comment 3 to this section goes on to state
that "[s]huuld the seller after making such a conditional delivery fail to follow up his
rights, the condition is waived. The provision [in § 2.702(2)] for a ten day limit within
which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is also ap-
plicable here," U.C.C. § 2-507 Official Comment 3 (emphasis added). The implication
of the comment is that the power to reclaim goods is a right which must be "followed
up" to preserve the seller's interest in the return of the property. Regretfully the Code
is unclear as to what actions by the seller would satisfy this requirement.
"	 U.C.C. § 9-503 (secured party's procedure for repossession upon clefituit).
U.C.C. § 2.702(2).
42
	§ 2-702 Comment 2. In In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210,
1212 (9th Cir. 1971), the court found that the "written misrepresentation be presented,
not dated, within the three months period." The court reasoned that the requirement
that the writing be dated within three months of delivery would severely limit the
seller's rights, since a businessman might reasonably rely on a statement received within
three months of delivery, but dated prior to that period. Hence, the date of' the state-
ment should not be given a strict application. Id.
"See, e.g., In re Creative Bldgs., inc., 498 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974); Amoco
Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1974); Theo..
Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Savings Batik, 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242
N.E.2d 911, 914-15 (App. Ct. 1968).
44 /n re Regency Furniture, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1381 (E.D. Tenn, 1970)
(decision of bankruptcy referee).
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and a letter virtually admitting insolvency but setting out a schedule
of payments." Some courts have also found that the seller, acting
with the prudence of an ordinary businessman, must have relied upon
the writing, despite the absence of any such requirement in section
2-702(2). 4 " Finally, several courts have expressly stated that the Code's
requirement of good faith is relevant to the seller's conduct in this
situation."
C. Possible Characterizations of Section 2-702(2)
The characterization of section 2-702(2) will often be decisive in
determining the reclaiming credit seller's success when he attempts to
reclaim goods from the bankruptcy trustee. Basically, three such
characterizations are important to such a determination:" section
2-702(2) might be regarded either as a codification of the common
law remedy of rescission for fraud, as an Article 2 security interest,"
or as a statutory lien. The first such characterization is probably the
more significant, given the defrauded seller's ability to recover against
the trustee tinder pre-Code law." The section 2-702(2) reclamation
right clearly was not created ex nihilo; its historical relationship to the
common law rescission right is obvious. In particular, its requirements
of receiving goods "while insolvent" and the need for a "written mis-
representation" seem to derive from the first and second branches of
the pre-Code remedy."' Yet there still are some fairly important dif-
ferences between the common law and U.C.C. right of reclamation.
First, section 2-702(2)'s ten day and three month time limitations are
obvious innovations." Secondly, section 2-702(2) marks a considerable
easing of the seller's evidentiary burden. Under prior law, the buyer's
receipt of the goods while insolvent usually established only a rebutta-
ble presumption of fraud," while according to Comment 2 to section
2-702 "Subsection (2) takes as its base line the proposition that any re-
45 In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46, 48 (D. Conn. 1965) (decision of bank-
ruptcy referee) (the court found no representation of solvency in the letter).
46 In re Creative Bldgs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974); Theo. Hamm Brew-
ing Co. r. First Trust & Savings Bank, 103 III. App. 2d 190, 195-96, 242 N.E.2d 911,
915 (1968); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 107-08 (S.D. Iowa
1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge). This requirement resembles the prior approach
under the common law. See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
" See cases cited at note 46 supra. See also U.C.C. 2-103(1)(b),
45 Here we are concerned with characterizations of § 2-702 arising independently
of Bankruptcy Act definitions. Thus, its possible characterization as a "priority" will not
be discussed here. On this, see notes 127-35 infra and accompanying text.
49 See U.C.C. § 9-113 and its comments.
5° See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
5 ' See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text.
52
 Under the common law the seller was under an obligation "to proceed
promptly" or act "within a reasonable time" in reclaiming the goods. Frech v. Lewis,
218 Pa. 141, 144, 67 A. 45, 46 (1907) (the court phrased these requirements in the cash
sale context),
33 See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
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ceipt of the goods on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit
business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent
against the particular seller." Third, it seems that at common law an
oral misrepresentation could give rise to a right of recovery, while
under section 2-702(2) only a written misrepresentation is given ex-
plicit treatment. Finally, under pre-Code law a seller trying to base his
recovery for fraud on the buyer's misrepresentation could he defeated
by a failure to show reasonable reliance or an adequate investigation
of dubious representations." Section 2-702(2) does not explicitly in-
clude such requirements, although a number of courts have grafted
these requirements onto the section. 5 ' These differences, however, do
not so outweigh section 2-702's origin in the common law that they
foreclose any contention that the section is a codification of the com-
mon law remedy f'or rescission for fraud. Hence, as witnessed by the
divergence among the courts, the question of the section's characteri-
zation as a codification of a common law remedy is not easily
resolved."
Section 2-702 is also susceptible to characterizations as either a
security interest or a statutory lien. The U.C.C.'s basic definition of
the term "security interest" in section 1-201(37)" is arguably broad
enough to include the section 2-702(2) reclamation right. Section
1-201(37) states that "Nile relention or reservation of title by a seller
of goods norivithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer ... is lim-
ited in effect. to a reservation of a 'security interest.' " If a reclaiming
seller may reserve the right to reclaim goods when the buyer is insol-
vent under 2-702(2), it could be argued that this reservation is a se-
curity interest under the section 1-201(37) definition. However, there
is authority to the effect that this section does not create a security in-
terest under the Code," presumably since section 9-113 does not in-
clude section 2-702 in its list. of sections which create Article 2 security
interests."
The other possibility is that section 2-702 may be regarded as
sufficiently similar to the host of legislatively-created liens benefiting
certain classes of parties supplying goods or services to he classed as a
"statutory lien." The resolution of this characterization rests partly in
the issue as to whether section 2-702 is merely a codification of the
common law remedy of rescission for fraud or whether the section is
so different from its common law origins that it should be charac-
51 See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
55 See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
58 See cases cited at notes 107 and 109 infra.
U.C.C.	 1-201(37) provides: " 'Security interest' means all interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
58 See In re Mel CoIcle Shoes, lnc., 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968); Ranchers &
Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. Ct. App.
1975). See also the authorities cited in Note, 53 N.C. L. REV. 169, 174 n.24 (1974). But
see note 227 infra and accompanying text.
59 U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment I.
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terized as primarily a stuatutory remedy." If the latter interpretation
is accepted, the additional problem arises as to whether section 2-702
is a lien. This problem is compounded by the fact that neither the
Bankruptcy Act nor the Code specifically defines a lien." Due to the
lack of any clear guidance from the Act or the Code, a resolution of
which characterization to apply to various sections of the Bankruptcy
Act has eluded the courts and the commentators. This dilemma will
present itself at several subsequent points in the article in terms of the
various strategies available to the seller when he attempts to protect
himself from a buyer's bankruptcy.
II. DEMAND AFTER BANKRUPTCY
The most common context in which conflicts between section
2-702(2) and the Bankruptcy Act arise is when the credit seller makes
his demand for the goods after the date of the buyer's bankruptcy
petition." The reason for the frequency of this sequence of events is
that the seller's discovery of the buyer's insolvency is often tied to a
decisive, public event such as the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
which is intended to put creditors on notice. As a result of the fre-
quency of this fact pattern, most of the reported litigation on the con-
flict between section 2-702 and the Bankruptcy Act involves precisely
this situation.
If the seller has attempted to reclaim after the bankruptcy of the
buyer, the trustee typically will oppose the reclamation on one or
more of three grounds. First, the trustee may utilize section 70(c) of
the Bankruptcy Act which grants the trustee the rights of a hypotheti-
cal lien creditor." Under this section the trustee may assert that he
has a superior interest in the goods as compared to the seller's right
to reclaim. Second, since section 67c(l)(A) of the Act invalidates cer-
tain statutory liens, the trustee may argue that section 2-702(2) is in-
valid as a lien created by statute." Finally, section 64(a) invalidates
various state created priorities which interfere with the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act." The trustee may utilize this section to invalidate
section 2-702(2) by attempting to demonstrate that the section is a
state created priority in defiance of section 64(a). 66
"" See notes 100-26 infra and accompanying text.
61 See notes 110-14 infra and accompanying text.
62 See In re Perskey & Wolf, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 812, 814 (N.D. Ohio
1976).
63 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
"Id. § 107(c)(1).
"Id. § 104(a).
66 it has been suggested that a reclaiming seller who makes a demand after bank-
ruptcy may be estoppel, since the reclamation may be considered a voidable preference
under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). See King-Voidable Preferences,
supra note 3, at 938. This argument essentially asserts that if a trustee can avoid a trans-
fer made by the bankrupt before bankruptcy, the trustee can use the same power to re-
sist making that transfer during bankruptcy. Although no one seems to have suggested
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in order to protect the assets of the bankrupt for distribution to
general creditors, the Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee extensive pow-
ers to invalidate certain transfers of the bankrupt to creditors and to
claim a priority to the bankrupt's property so as to invalidate secret or
invalid liens." Much of this power is derived from section 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act which provides in relevant part that:
The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the
rights and powers of ... a creditor who upon the date of
bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceed-
ings upon all property upon which a creditor of the
bankrupt upon a simple contract could have obtained such
a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists."
Section 70(c) has been termed the "strong-arm" clause of the Bank-
ruptcy Act., it provision by which the trustee becomes an "ideal cred-
itor ... armed cap-a-pie with every right and power which is con-
ferred by the law of the state upon its most favored creditor who has
acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings.'" The power so
granted, however, operates "as of' the date of bankruptcy: that is, the
trustee is effectively deemed to have completed the steps necessary for
perfection of his lien on the date of bankruptcy. As a result, the trus-
tee is precluded from overcoming the claims of preceding lienholders
or other interested parties by picking the optimal time or times fur
the perfection of hypothetical liens!" It should also be noted that sec-
tion 70(c) does not require the trustee to locate an actual, existing
party who could have asserted the right assumed by the trustee!'
In this context, if the trustee is a lien creditor "with every right
and power which is conferred by the law of the state," determination
of "ideal lien creditor" status under section 70(c) should first suggest
it, it is conceivable that this "estoppel" argument 'night be used by the trustee in
connection with § 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1970), which also rai-
ders transfers made by the bankrupt voidable by the trustee. In any event, the effect. of
these two sections of the Bankruptcy Act upon a 2-702 reclaiming seller will be dis-
cussed fully under the next division, which addresses the problems of a seller who has
exercised his reclamation right prior to bankruptcy. See notes 166-202 irifra and ac-
companying text.
67 See 4A COW ER, supra note 3, f 70.45 at 557-60.
" 8 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
69 In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1960), quoting In re Waynesboro
Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss, 1932).
"See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961):
Ulf we construe § 70c as petitioner does, there would be no period of re-
pose. Security transactions entered into in good faith years before the
bankruptcy could be upset if' the trustee were ingenious enough to conjure
up a hypothetical situation in which a hypothetical creditor might have
had such a right.
T 1
 See 4A CoLuER.supra note 3, 9 70.50, at 609-14. But See Pacific Fin. Corp. v.
Edwards, 304 F.2d 224, 228.29 (9th Cir. 1962).
Id.
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reference to the Uniform Commercial Code's statements on the rights
of lien creditors as against the rights of the reclaiming seller. The
1962 version of section 2-702(3) provided a superficially clear state-
ment on this point: "The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2)
is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good
faith purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403)." 72
This language, when combined with section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act, seemingly provided a definite answer to the question posed: the
trustee as lien creditor should always triumph over the reclaiming
2-702 seller. 73 However, the Third Circuit's famous and controversial
decision of In re Kravitz 74 took a somewhat different reading of the rel-
evant language, and in the process touched off a major dispute
among commercial and bankruptcy law commentators which has ex-
posed serious code ambiguities and omissions in this area. 75
Kravitz involved the competing rights of the seller and the trus-
tee to goods delivered on credit to the buyer three days before his in-
voluntary petiton in bankruptcy." One day after the petition was filed
the seller attempted to reclaim the goods under section 2-702(2). Both
the bankruptcy referee and district court rejected the seller's claim. 77
In affirming this decision, the Third Circuit did not interpret section
2-702(3) 78 as directly subordinating a credit seller to a lien creditor or
a trustee. Instead, the court noted that section 2-702(3) refers to sec-
tion 2-403 in defining the relative rights of a seller and a lien
creditor." The only reference in section 2-403 to lien creditors is that
"[Ole rights of ... lien creditors are governed by the [Article] on Se-
71 U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962 version).
" See S hanker—Reply, supra note 3, at 97 -98.
" 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
"See generally Hillman, Interpreting the Uniform Commerical Code: UCC Section
1-103 and "Code Methodology," 18 B.C. IND.& Copt. L. REV. - (1977).
16 278 F.2d at 821.
" Id. Neither the referee's decision nor the district court decision has been pub-
lished. However, Professor Morris Shanker, who personally examined the full Kravitz
File, has concluded that: 1) Kravitz was decided under an earlier version of section
2-702(2), see U.C.C. 2-702 (1952 version), which lacked the current exclusion of the
common law fraud remedy (on the latter, see also notes 142.54 infra and accompanying
text); 2) the district court opinion seemed to hold that the § 2-702 reclamation right
would be unavailable to the seller because of its subordination to a lien creditor via sec-
tion 2-702(3); 3) counsel for the seller definitely advanced a common law fraud theory
before the referee; and 4) the case therefore proceeded largely under a common law
fraud theory before the lower courts. See Shanker, supra note 3, at 42. However, the
court of appeals, while not completely clear as to the theory under which it was pro-
ceeding, did give considerable attention to section 2-702 and other sections of the Code,
as the following discussion should indicate.
78 The applicable version of § 2-702 in Kravitz differed somewhat from the 1962
version quoted in the text. See text at note 72 supra. This earlier version in relevant
part provided that "where a seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may ... (b)
subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or lien creditor under this Article
(Section 2-403), and within ten days after receipt, reclaim any goods received by the
buyer on credit ... ." Kravitz, 278 F.2d at 821; U.C.C. § 2.702(1) (1952 version).
" 278 F.2d at 821. Section 2-403 is quoted at note 220 infra.
620
THE RECLAIMING SE! LER AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
cured Transactions (Article 9) _...."8" The court then referred to sec-
tion 9-301(3), which defines a lien creditor as "a trustee in bankruptcy
from the date of the filing of the petition."' The court interpreted
this section as recognizing that the rights of a trustee as lien creditor
are governed by the Bankruptcy Act." The Third Circuit then stated:
"It is perfectly clear that, while Section 70, sub. c of the Bankruptcy
Act makes the trustee an ideal lien creditor, what such a lien creditor
gets is determined by the law of the state involved ...."" However,
in referring to state law, the court apparently did not regard the Code
as dispositive with respect to the rights of a lien creditor as against the
reclaiming seller. Instead, it resorted to pre-Code Pennsylvania law 84
finding that the reclaiming seller, even if defrauded, could not
triumph over certain lien creditors." Then, after holding that nothing
in the U.C.C. changed this rule, it found for the trustee, affirming the
district court decision."" In effect, the court reasoned that since the
U.C.C. does not provide any guidance as to the rights of the parties,
pre-Code law should apply."
The legislative reaction to Kravitz did not take long to develop.
By 1962, at least two states had amended or enacted section 2-702(3)
to eliminate the "lien creditor" language."" In commenting on this
reaction in an article of the same year, Professor Hawkland noted that
Kravitz did not hold that the trustee would inevitably triumph through
the operation of Code Sections 2-702(3), 2-403(4), and 9-301(3). 8" He
contended that the result in Kravitz was "an anomaly peculiar to
Pennsylvania" because of that state's unusual pre-Code rule regarding
the relative rights of the reclaiming seller and a lien creditor." While
arguing that the legislative history of section 2-702 really made such a
" 278 F.2d at 821-22. See U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (1952 version).
U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1952 version).
" 278 F.2d at 822. The court stated:
We think the correct way to put ,the matter is that by federal law the
trustee in bankruptcy is made a lien creditor and that this right thus given
him is recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code which simply states
the power of the trustee as created by the prevailing law, that is, the fed-
eral law of bankruptcy.
Id.
83 Id.
84 The cases cited by the court for authority were Schwartz v. McClosekey, 156
Pa. 258, 27 A. 300 (1893) and Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901).
85 278 F.2d at 822.
"° Id.
87 Sec Shanker, supra note 3, at. 40-43 where the author presents an intriguing ar-
gument that Kravitz rested on an analysis of common law fraud, since the prior version
of § 2-702 did not limit the use of other fraud defenses. See note 77 supra. He con-
cludes that § 2-702 under the 1962 version explicitly cuts off the rights of the seller in
favor of the lien creditor. Id. See note 97 ityra.
" See 1961 M. Laws, at 2101, § 2-702 (codified at ILL.. ANN. STAT. tit. 26, § 2-702
(1974) (Smith-Hurd) ); 1961 N.M. Laws, ch. 96, § 2-702 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
50A-2-702 (1962) ).
" See Hawkland, supra note 3, at 88.
"Id.
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Id.
change unnecessary, Professor Hawkland nevertheless advocated an
amendment to section 2-702(3) deleting its "or lien creditor"
language."' In 1966, the Permanent Editorial hoard for the Uniform
Commercial Code adopted this change," 2 although a sizeable majority
of the states still retain the pre-1966 version." 3
The effect of Kravitz and the 1966 amendment has been to
further complicate the problem of interpreting section 2-702. In states
which have not adopted the 1966 amendment, two general ap-
proaches seem to have emerged. The first of these basically supports
the Kravitz result: recourse to pre-Code law to determine the relative
rights of seller and lien creditor." 4 In most states," 3 the recourse to
91 See id,:
IT ]here is no indication whatsoever from the legislative history of the Uni-
form Commercial Code that 2-702 was intended to give the trustee more
rights vis-a-vis the defrauded seller than he was accorded under previous
law. Because 2-702(3), however, can be read as doing precisely what its
draftsmen manifestly did not want done, an amendment to the section
seems in order.... The amendment to 2-702(3), of course, should not be
considered as legislative history fur the conclusion that the defrauded sell-
er necessarily prevails over the trustee in bankruptcy. Its intention is
merely to adopt the rule of the Kravitz Case, as correctly read and applied.
" PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No.
3, at 3 (1967). This has been incorporated in U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1972 version).
" For a more or less current listing, see UNIFORNI LAWS ANNOTATED, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL. CODE, § 2-702, at 350 (1976). According to that listing, sixteen states have
adopted the new language.
"4
 Actually, there seems to be a variety of approaches here, all of which reach the
same result. First, there is the Kravitz rationale, with its progression through §§
2-702(3), 2-403(4), and 9-301(3), with a final conclusion that the Code is basically sup-
portive of section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. See notes 74-87 supra and accompanying
text.
The second approach is basically similar, but differs in the details of its applica-
tion. Crucial to it is the assertion that § 2-702(3) does not of itself define the lien cred-
itor rights to which it refers, and that reference to section 2-403 must be made to de-
termine these rights. Since only subsection 2-403(4) refers to these rights, and since it
merely makes a reference to Article 9 (effectively § 9-301), that section must be con-
sulted to determine their content. However, unlike Kravitz, this approach does not look
to § 9-301(3), but rather to § 9-301 (1)(b), which states that the holder of an unper-
fected security interest is subordinate to the interests of a lien creditor. However, since
the § 2-702(2) reclamation right is presumably not a security interest, recourse to pre-
Code law must be made to determine the relative rights of the seller and lien creditor-
trustee. See, e.g., DULSENBERG & KING, supra note 3, § 13.03[4] at 13-26.2 to 13-33. Cf.
Bjornstad, supra note 3, at 358. At least two cases have followed this approach. See in re
Mel Guide Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1968) (involving contest between
reclaiming seller and lien creditor; seller held to triumph under pre-Code Kentucky
law); In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep, Serv. 61, 64 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (decision
of bankruptcy referee) (seller triumphs over trustee under pre-Code Tennessee law).
The third approach is simply to view § 2-702(2) as a codification of the common
law remedy of recission for fraud, and thus to avoid its confusing relations with §§
2-702(3), 2-403, and 9-301. See King, supra note 3, at 82:
In the abstract, therefore, there are definite problems of classifica-
tion and real problems of effectuating the protection intended [by the
U.C.C. for the seller]. But is it at all necessary, even proper, to view the in-
teraction [between § 2-702 and the Bankruptcy Act] solely in the abstract?
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pre-Code law should produce a triumph for the seller over the trustee
because at common law the defrauded seller typically would defeat an
attaching lien creditor."
The second approach is to view the Code as a self-contained
body of law in which the seller is expressly subordinated to a lien cred-
itor by section 2-702(3), without any need to consult the cross refer-
ences to section 2-403 and to Article 9." 7 This approach, obviously,
will result in victory for the trustee in all states where the original
2-702(3) language is still in force, since under that version the seller's
right to reclaim "is subject to the rights of a ... lien creditor." Con-
Historically, the seller's right to reclaim was recognized in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, assuming he could prove whatever ingredients of
fraud were necessary. At least this was true in most jurisdictions which did
not grant superior rights to an intervening attaching or levying creditor.
For this very basic reason the trustee was not permitted the use of § 70(c)
rflhere is no reason to believe that the situation should be any
different under the Uniform Commercial' Code. The intention - of its
draftsmen clearly was to eliminate the necessity of proving fraud or mis-
representation in the case of the ten-day demand. If you will, the Uniform
Commercial Code made no change; it carried over the fraud element but
accepted its existence as an irrebutable presumption. Accordingly, there is
absolutely no reason for a bankruptcy court to view § 2-702(2) as any
startling change. There is absolutely no reason to regard it as having
opened the door to a different construction injurious to the seller. There
is not a new right; it is the same old one. It should be remembered that, in
substance, neither the Uniform Commercial Code nor the Bankruptcy Act
has been changed in any respect to require departure from prior prece-
dent or even to permit reappraisal of the principles.
Id. See also In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.G.C. Rep, Sen... 61, 63-64 (E,D, Tenn. 1970)
(decision of bankruptcy referee), approvingly citing the above article and holding that
the seller could triumph over the trustee under Tennessee law. As discussed in the pre-
vious paragraph, this case also took an attitude toward the Code language basically simi-
lar to that of the second approach described above, thus suggesting a basic compatibility
between that view and the one developed here.
"See, e.g., Hawkland, supra note 3, at 88; Note, 79 HAav, L. RIN.,supra note 3, at
610.
I' See notes 17 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
"See Countryman, supra note 3, at 457; Shanker-Reply, supra note 3, at 96-98;
Shanker, supra note 3, at 40-42. This view seems to have been followed in several cases.
See In re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387, 391-93 (5.1). Tex. 1968) (deci-
sion of bankruptcy referee); In re Behring & Bchring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606-07
(N.D. Tex. 1968) (decision of bankruptcy referee); In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
46, 48.49 (I). Conn. 1965) (decision of bankruptcy referee); In re Eastern Supply Co., 1
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151, 153.54 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (decision of bankruptcy judge), affd,
331 17 .2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964). See also In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv, 1142,
1144-50 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge), alld, 402 F. Supp. 1357
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (expressing approval for this view but feeling constrained by prece-
dent to make recourse to pre-Code law). Cf: DUESENISERG & KING, supra note 3, §
13.0314] at 13-33 to 13-36.
Also, Professor Shanker has argued that the § 2-702(2) seller should be subordi-
nated to the trustee because the goods sold should be deemed "on sale or return"
under U.C.C. § 2-326, and because the 2-702 reclamation right is an unperfected se-
curity interest subject to a lien creditor by U,C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). Shanker-Rep/y, supra
note 3, at 98-102. But see notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
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versely in those states where the 1966 amendment has been adopted,
the seller is likely to triumph in almost all cases. If, as is most likely,
the amendment is viewed as removing from the Code any pretense to
establishing the relative rights of seller and lien creditor, a reference
to pre-Code law will be necessary. As has been suggested, this should
enable the creditor seller to recover from the trustee in most states,
since the pre-Code law of a majority of the states favors the reclaim-
ing seller over the lien creditor." However, the amendment might
also be seen in its historical context as a positive state declaration that
the seller should triumph over the lien creditor in all situations, in-
cluding instances in which the state's pre-Code rule would favor the
lien creditor. The basis for this argument would rest on the premise
that if under the 1962 version of 2-702(3), the reclaiming seller's
rights were subject to those of a lien creditor, the removal of the
words "lien creditor" from that section would indicate that the legis-
lature no longer wished to subordinate the seller to the trustee in
bankruptcy."
B. Section 67c(1)
Even if the seller attempting to reclaim after bankruptcy is not
frustrated by section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, section 67c(1)(A) 1 "
may still prove to be an obstacle. Section 67c(1)(A) states in relevant
part that "every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the
insolvency of the debtor" is "invalid against the trustee."'" Since the
section 2-702(2) reclamation right depends upon the seller's discovery
of the buyer's insolvency, this language seems to satisfy that require-
ment of section 67c(1)(A).'° 2
 The pivotal issue, then, is whether sec-
"" See note 95 supra.
"" But see note 91 supra.
""Commentary on the relationship between § 2-702(2) and § 67c of the Bank-
ruptcy Act includes: Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under Section 2 -702, 21
N.Y.L.F. 41 (1975); Note, 32 WASH. A.: LEI L. Rev. 1001 (1975); Note, 53 N.C. L. Rev.
169 (1974); Note, 35 U. Purr. L. REV. 922 (1974).
'°' 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970). Section 67c(l)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act
might also work to block the reclaiming seller. This section provides in part that, subject
to certain provisos, "every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the
date of bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona tide purchaser from the
debtor on that date, whether or not such a purchaser exists," will be invalid against the
trustee. Id. § 107(c) (1) (B). See 4 COWER, supra note 3, at 11 67.281[2.2]. Section
2-702(3) of the Code of course makes the seller's § 2-702 reclamation right "subject to
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser .. ." Still, the
basic issue—whether § 2-702 is a "statutory lien"—is obviously the same under either
bankruptcy provision. See notes 104-14 infra and accompanying text.
"'The Bankruptcy Act states that:
A person shalt be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this title
whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which
he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to
be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his cred-
itors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts
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Lion 2-702 is a "statutory lien."'" The cases addressing this question
typically raise three basic issues: (I) whether the section 2-702 remedy
is actually "statutory"; (2) whether the 2-702 reclamation right is a
"lien"; and (3) what was the legislative intent and purpose of section
67c.
1. Section 2-702 as a Statutory Remedy
Section 1(29a) of the Bankruptcy Act defines a "statutory lien"
as:
a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified cir-
cumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien
provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give se-
curity, whether or not such lien is also provided by or is also
dependent upon statute and whether or not the agreement
or lien is made fully effective by statute."'
The 2-702(2) reclamation right clearly arises "by force of statute upon
specified circumstances or conditions," but one court has argued that
section 2-702(2) is not a statutory lien because the lien does not arise
"solely by force of statute."" 5 The court reasoned that section 2-702's
relationship with the common law remedy of rescission for fraud" 6
implies that the Code did not create a new remedy but merely
11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970). The Uniform Commercial Code, on the other hand, states
that "[a] person is 'insolvent' who has either ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the
meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. § 1-201(23). Obviously, the Code
definition of insolvency is broader than that of the Bankruptcy Act, and for this reason
there may be instances in which a valid demand under If 2-702 may not become "effec-
tive upon the insolvency of' the debtor" in the bankruptcy sense. But see 4 Counit,supra
note 3, 11 67.28 1[2.1) at 419-20, where it is suggested that the suite law definition of' in-
solvency should apply in case of a discrepancy.
Also, it might be argued that the gt 2-702(2) reclamation right is conditioned on a
host of faciors other than the debtor's insolvency. See Note, 32 WAsti, lie LEE L. REv.
1001, 1014 (1975).
"'" For cases holding that 2-702(2) is a statutory lien, see In re Perskey & Wolf',
Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 812 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (decision of bankruptcy referee); In re
Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1367.68 (E.D. Mich. 1975), affirming 12 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Giltex, Inc., 17
U.C.C. Rep, Serv. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D.N.J. 1974). See also In re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188 (1st
Cir. 1971); In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), alp, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.
1968) (Trahan and Nieves deal with interpretations of' civil codes). But see In re Telemart
Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975); In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
" 4
 1 l U.C.C. * 1(29a) (1970).
105 1ri re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(decision of bankruptcy judge).
1 " See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
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codified the common law. 107
 The cases holding otherwise, however,
stress the differences between section 2-702(2) and the traditional
fraud remedy'' in contending that 2-702 is primarily a new statu-
tory remedy which falls within the ambit of Bankruptcy Act sections
1(29a) and 67c(1)(A)."" This conflict as to the derivation of section
2-702(2) is difficult to resolve, since the section contains elements of
both the common law and new statutory rights and remedies. For this
reason, either argument is defensible and available as a strategy for
the trustee or seller.
2. Section 2-702 as a lien
In Section 1(29a)'s definition of the term "statutory lien" seems
to assume a recognized meaning for the term "lien," notwithstanding
the fact that this term is not defined either by the Code or by the
Bankruptcy Act. Most generally, a "lien" seems to be regarded as a
hold or claim on property for the payment of some debt, obligation
or duty.'" This definition suggests that the lien should terminate
upon payment of the debt, and some courts have contended that the
2-702(2) reclamation right similarly terminates upon the buyer's pay-
ment in arguing that it is in effect a "lien.""' In contrast, another
court has regarded the exclusivity of the 2-702 remedy 12 as differen-
tiating it from the typical lien, since a lien holder can sell the property
and recover any deficiency from the debtor as an unsecured creditor
whereas the 2-702 seller cannot." 3
 If section 2-702(2) is characterized
as a codification of the common law fraud remedy, the section could
be regarded as a lien, since the rescission right may be viewed as an
interest in property for the payment of a debt. However, the common
167
 In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge). One commentator, however, has suggested that
this argument should not be utilized, principally because it would involve a burdensome
comparison of the alleged lien with various possible common law antecedents in order
to determine its status as ''solely statutory." See Note, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv, 1001,
1009-10 (1975).
108
 On the characterization of § 2-702(2), see notes 48-55 supra and accompany-
ing text
um See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 889.90 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Federal's, Inc„ 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1364-65, 1367 (E.D. Mich. 1975); In re Wetson's
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
""See, e.g., 51 Am. juk.2d Liens § 1 at 142-43 (1970); BLACKS LAW DIci10NARY
1072-73 (rev'd 4th ed. 1968). For a compendium of definitions of this term, see Note,
53 N.C. L. REV. 169, 172-73 (1974).
"' See In re Giltex, Inc„ 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re
Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bank-
ruptcy judge).
" 2 U.C.C. § 2-702(3) provides: "Successful reclamation of goods excludes all
other remedies with respect to them."
13 See In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430, 432-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge). But see In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 1357, 1367 (E.D. Mich. 1975), affirming 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich.
1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
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law right of rescission is based upon the concept that the buyer has
not given up full title to the goods." 4 Hence, it could also be argued
that the right of rescission- was not a lien since it represented more
than an interest in property for the payment of a debt.
3. Legislative History of Section 67c
To determine whether a reclaiming seller under 2-702(2) meets
the statutory requirement of section 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, sev-
eral courts have resorted to the legislative history of section 67c for
clarification of the phrase "statutory lien."" 5 These courts have gen-
erally concluded that Congress' enactment of sections 1(29a) and
67c(1)(A) was part of an ongoing process which favors the trustee's
power to invalidate state-created priorities which are designed to cir-
cumvent the policies of the Bankruptcy Act for the distribution of the
bankrupt's estate. In the view of these decisions, this process effec-
tively began in 1938 when the Act was amended to eliminate the gen-
eral recognition in bankruptcy of state-created priorities.' 16 Previous
to 19'38 the states were permitted to decide which group of creditors
should receive priority after the satisfaction of all valid liens.'" After
the 1938 amendments several states attempted to circumvent the
elimination of such priorities by casting what arguably were actual
priorities in the guise of liens, thereby insuring such otherwise invalid
priorities an enhanced status."" I n 1966 Congress responded to this
situation by amending section 67 to expand the list of statutory liens
specifically declared invalid in bankruptcy."" Several courts in tracing
this development have reasoned that the 2-702(2) reclamation right is
a statutory lien which was intended by Congress to be invalidated by
section 67c(1)(A).""
While the legislative history of the Act may demonstrate a gen-
eral trend to invalidate disguised priorities,"' the legislative interpre-
tation of the pertinent sections leads to some confusion as to their
specific application. The House and Senate Reports accompanying the
" 4 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
"See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); in re
Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 427-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Federal's, Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 1357, 1367-68 (E.D. Mich. 1975); In re Good Deal Supermarkets Inc., 384
F. Supp. 887, 889 (D.N.J. 1974).
" 8 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 64, 52 Stat. 874.
"' See discussion in In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
"See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). On the
distinction between priorities and liens, ;we 3A supra note 3, 1 64.02[21 at
2065-69.
u° Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3, 4, 80 Stat. 268-69 (as codified in
11 U.S.C. §§ 107(c)(1)(A), (8), (C) (1970) ). The general recognition of state created
statutory liens was retained in the new § 67(b). II § 107(b) (1970).
"See, e.g., In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In
re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1367-68 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
"'See In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357, 1367-68 & n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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1966 amendments make no reference to section 2-702 of the U.C.C.
or to the problems presented in Kravitz.'" This notwithstanding, the
history does reveal a congressional concern to invalidate "liens which
become effective only in the event of insolvency." 123
 However, the his-
tory appears to except from the reach of section 67c(l)(A) "a specific
property right which may be asserted independently of a general dis-
tribution and regardless of the transfer of the property." 124 Section
2-702(2) does of course apply only in the event of insolvency, but it
could also operate "independently of a general distribution," it' there
were no bankruptcy proceeding. However, the section cannot operate
"regardless of the transfer of the property," since section 2-702(3) ex-
pressly subordinates the seller to a "buyer in ordinary course or other
good faith purchaser."'" All of this notwithstanding, it has also been
held that due to section 2-702's alleged basis in the common law of
fraud the section does not conflict with the legislative purpose of sec-
tion 67c. 126
The foregoing analysis would seem to indicate that the intent of
Congress in' enacting section 67c(1)(A) is far from clear when applied
to the 2-702(2) reclamation right. This indicates once more the wide-
ranging impact of the basic problem of characterizing section
2-702(2)'s genesis and nature. If the court views 2-702 as merely a
codification of the common law, the section is not primarily a statu-
"2 See H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. REP. No. 1159, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The Senate reports
are found in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2442-68.
123 S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in [1966) U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2457.
"'/d. at 2461.
143 The foregoing discussion of § 67c's legislative history should be compared to
the discussion in In re Giitex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
145 In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975). The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated in Telemart that:
Section 67c, as amended in 1966, is an attempt to minimize state conflicts
with federal priorities by invalidating as against the trustee some of the
more obviously spurious liens, those which function more as priorities in
bankruptcy than as property interests....
Section 67c is thus a remedial trimming-back of the special exemp-
tion conferred on statutory liens by section 67b. It was not intended to
serve as a new tool by which the trustee could cut down provisions of state
law obviously not entitled to the benefits of section 67b. As discussed
below, under section 2-702(2) receipt of goods on credit while insolvent is
deemed a fraud on the creditor rendering the sale voidable. The sale thus
is defective from its inception. Clearly no new security has been given for
an antecedent debt; the "lien," if it is conceived as such, attached at the in-
stant the debt was created.... Section 2-702(2) clearly, therefore, was not
an attempt to escape the effect of section 60 by creating a spurious statu-
tory lien, and enactment of section 2-702(2) did riot present the abuse
which section 67c was designed to combat....
Id. at 764. The Telemart court's references to 60 of the Bankruptcy Act seem princi-
pally intended to illuminate the intent and purpose of Congress in amending § 67. The
case did not involve anything like a preferential transfer, and none of the other 67c
cases cited in note 115 supra pursued this line of argument.
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tory remedy or the type of state priority Congress intended to in-
validate. Under this interpretation, the state's enactment of section
2-702 could not be viewed as an attempt to circumvent the ban on
state-created priorites, since the right to reclaim already existed at
common law. However, if the section is characterized as primarily a
new statutory remedy it should be invalidated by section 67c(I)(A) as a
statutory lien.
C. Section 64(a)
The question of whether section 2-702 of the Code should be
considered as a statutory enactment of the common-law fraud remedy
is also crucial to yet another attack on the section's efficacy in
bankruptcy—its alleged status as a disguised state-created priority
under section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act. 127 As noted earlier,'" before
1938 the Act gave priority to debts of the bankrupt owing to any per-
sons who by the laws of the State or of the United States were entitled
thereto.' 2 " The 1938 amendment to section 64 eliminated this general
recogntion, usually consigning the party owed such a debt to general
creditor status.'"" In In re Federal's Inc.,"' both the bankruptcy referee
and the reviewing District Judge held that section 2-702, whose
employment by the seller was felt to be practically (if not legally) tied to
the buyer's petition in bankruptcy, was in effect a state-created prior-
ity in clear defiance of the federal standards set out by section 64. 112
A contrary result was reached in In re Te!mart Entoprises, Inc.'"
where the Ninth Circuit held that section 2-702 is not in conflict with
section 64. The court reasoned that a state would be in violation of
section 64 only if it conferred a priority after the bankrupt received a
nondefeasible title in the property.' 34 If section 2-702 and its common
law basis only creates a voidable title in the seller, then section 2-702
cannot be an interference with a nondefeasible title and, hence, is not
a state-created priority.' 35
D. Summwy
Generally speaking, the seller's position if he attempts to reclaim
127
 I I U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
123 See notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
12" Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 563.
(3"
 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 64, 52 Stat. 874.
' 3 ' 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (decision of bankruptcy referee),
alp, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich 1975). See also In re Perskey & Wolf, Inc., 19 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 812 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (decision of bankruptcy referee).
(32
 402 F. Supp. at 1365-67; 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1150-52. It is worth noting
that both Federal's decisions declared section 2-702 totally inoperative in bankruptcy.
402 F. Supp. at 1368; 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1153. For a contrary view, see In re
Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
(33
 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975).
134 Id. at 765-66.
PH Id,
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after bankruptcy is problematical at best. If the trustee as an "ideal
lien creditor" utilizes section 70(c), the seller should usually triumph
in the minority of states which have adopted the 1966 amendment to
U.C.C. section 2-702(3). For states which retain the "lien creditor"
language in that section, the result will basically depend upon whether
the court opts for a self-contained Code resolution of the seller-lien
creditor priority problem (in which case the seller will lose), or instead
employs pre-Code law to resolve this question (in which case the seller
typically will win). Under section 67c, the courts are divided, but the
weight of authority now favors the trustee. The trustee's success in
utilizing section 64 is uncertain, because of the dearth of cases dealing
with this point.' 36
As was suggested in the first section of this article,'" the charac-
terization of section 2-702(2) has distinct implications for the reclaim-
ing seller's success in bankruptcy. If the section is deemed to be a
statutory lien, the seller obviously will fail under section 67c. 138 Simi-
larly, if the 2-702 right to reclaim is characterized as a security in-
terest, the seller's claim will be defeated under section 70(c). 13° If the
2-702(2) reclamation right is characterized as basically a codification of
the common law remedy of rescission for fraud, however, it should
survive attack under sections 67c and 64.' 4 ° Still, while this characteri-
zation should be helpful on the section 70(c) question, it probably
would not be dispositive there, since the argument under that section
has centered on the use of "lien creditor" in section 2-702(3) and not
on 2-702's basis in common law."'
E. Invalidation of the Section 2-702 Right to Reclaim
This section has considered three statutory provisions by which a
trustee may overcome a seller's attempt to reclaim after bankruptcy;
sections 64(a), 67c(1)(A), and 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. The discus-
sion as to these provisions has centered on the various issues involved
in deciding whether the trustee or the seller should prevail. Addi-
tional consideration should be given to the question of what practical
result will occur once a court has decided which party should prevail
136
 It would seem likely that if section 2-702(2) is deemed a priority, it should not
he regarded as a statutory lien. However, the cases dealing with both sections are un-
clear on this point.
1 " See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
I " However, if § 2-702(2) is regarded as a statutory lien, the trustee's § 70(c)
claim might fail, depending on the language and interpretation of the relevant version
of § 2-702 as regards priorities. See 53 C.J.S. Liens § 10, at 856-57 (1948).
' 39
 This is because U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) subordinates an unperfected security in-
terest to a lien creditor. Also, if section 2.702(2) is characterized as a security interest, it
may also be regarded as a statutory lien, (or at least as a lien), and vice-versa. Cf.
Kennedy. supra note 3, at 834-36; Note, 53 N.C.L. REV. 169, 173-76 (1974). See also
notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
14 ° See notes 104-09, 133-35 supra and accompanying text.
'" But see note 94 supra.
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under these sections. If the seller prevails against the trustee, he may
reclaim the goods, since the trustee would be unable to claim a prior-
ity or invalidate the effect of section 2-702. Of course, if the trustee
prevails as the ideal lien creditor under section 70(c) an opposite re-
sult occurs, since the seller would be subordinated to the trustee.
However, if the trustee prevails by invalidating section 2-702 as either
a statutory lien under section 67c(I)(A) or as a state-created priority
under section 64(a), the seller may still be able to reclaim the goods
under the common law right of rescission. The question of whether
the seller may thus overcome the invalidation of section 2-702 centers
first on whether the section is an exclusive remedy which precludes
the seller from resorting to his rights of rescission under the common
law. Section 2-702(2) does provide that "leNcept as provided in this
subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the
buyers' fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of in-
tent to pay." The effect of this section is to deny the seller any use of
the common law right of rescission since this relief is based on a
theory of fraud or innocent misrepresentation.'" However, if section
2-702(2) is invalidated by the Bankruptcy Act, the second question
arises as to whether the section's limitation upon the common law rem-
edy is also nullified.
The questions of exclusivity and invalidation have been consid-
ered in three recent cases which have held that the common law rem-
edy of rescission does survive the invalidation of section 2-702(2)." 3
These cases involved the specific question of whether section 2-702
should be invalidated as a statutory lien under section 67c(l)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Act. In the referee's decision for In re Federal's, Judge
Brody gave the seller whose 2-702(2) reclamation was invalidated by
section 67c(1)(A) the option of reverting to a cause of action based
upon pre-Code fraud.'" However, his decision in this regard was
premised on the controversial view that section 67c, if applicable, to-
tally negates the effect. of section 2-702 in bankruptcy proceedings. 145
However, in In re Wetson's,'" Judge Herzog took a different tack,
finding the exclusivity provision of section 2-702(2) inapplicable for
the following reasons:
Equitable considerations require that I reject the argument
142 See notes 13-29 supra and accompanying text.
141 In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision
of bankruptcy judge); In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142, 1153 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (decision of
bankruptcy judge),
'" Judge Brody stated: "Since the provision of the Uniform Commercial Code in
issue here is in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act it has no application in this proceed-
ing. Panasonic's right to reclaim its property therefore must be determined by reference
to Michigan law other than the Code." 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142, 1153 (E.D. Mich.
1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
' 46 See note 132 supra.
" 6
 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
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that since § 2-702 is by its final sentence, made an exclusive
remedy,once it is invalidated by § 67c(1)(A), the seller is left
without a remedy. I find the argument specious and the
notion abhorrent to a court of equity. Surely § 2-702 must
be read together and the last sentence of subsection (2)
must be taken to mean that § 2-702 is the exclusive remedy
if it survives attack by the trustee, and if invalidated by §
67c(1)(A) the seller is not to be deprived of any pre-Code
remedy he may have had.' 47
In In re GiItex, the third recent case, the court followed Judge
Herzog's reasoning.'"
Thus, three courts have permitted sellers to circumvent the
many 2-702/Bankruptcy Act conflicts discussed above by permitting a
recourse to pre-Code fraud law where section 2-702 is invalidated in
bankruptcy. Since it allows a reversion to non-uniform pre-Code rem-
edies, this reasoning stands in ironic contrast to the fundamental
proposition that Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code was in-
tended to augment and make cumulative and uniform the various
remedies available to aggrieved parties under a sales contract.'" Also,
the view of section 2-702(2)'s exclusivity provision in the Wesson's case
is, to say the least, uncertain.'" Moreover, the reclaiming seller's
problems in proving common law fraud are likely to exceed his
evidentiary difficulties under section 2-702,' 5 ' although, if he can
prove fraud under the common law, he should almost always triumph
over the trustee.'" All things considered, it would behoove future re-
claiming credit sellers to include a common law fraud count in their
reclamation petitions. An argument based upon the common law right
of rescission may proi'e crucial if the seller is unable to overcome a
trustee's contention that section 2-702(2) is invalid under section
67c(1)(A) as a statutory lien.
The effect of these three cases upon other Bankruptcy Act pro-
visions is presently unclear since the cases only deal with the invalida-
tion of section 2-702(2) under section 67c(1)(A). However, the lan-
guage in these cases is general enough to be applied to other Bank-
ruptcy Act provisions. For example, the invalidation of 2-702(2) as a
state created priority under section 64(a) could have the same effect
as invalidation under 67c(1)(A).' 53 Hence, a seller may be permitted
"T Id. at 429.
''" 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
'"See,	 U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2); 2-703, Comment 1.
'See In re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387, 392 (S.D. Tex. 1968)
(decision of bankruptcy referee).
16 ' Sec notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
762 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
'" It should be noted that the language of § 64(a) and § 67c(1)(A) differ to the
extent that one could argue that § 64(a) does not specifically invalidate the exclusivity
provision of § 2-702(2). Section 67c(1)(A) states that certain statutory liens are "invalid
against the trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1) (1970). However, § 64(a) does not mention
the invalidation of state-created priorities. As noted earlier, see text at notes 116-18 &
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to resort to common law remedies if 2-702(2) is invalidated as a state
created priority. The possible effect of these cases upon other Bank-
ruptcy Act sections will be considered later in this article.' S 4
III. RECLAMA'F1ON BEFORE BANKRUPTCY
As demonstrated in the previous discussion, the position of the
reclaiming credit seller vis-a-vis the trustee is problematical at best
where he attempts reclamation under section 2-702(2) after the date
of the bankruptcy petition. However, assuming that the seller becomes
aware of the buyer's insolvency early enough, he might enhance his
chances of success if he can effect a reclamation of the goods before
bankruptcy. In this context, actual physical repossession of the goods
may not be necessary, since, if the technical requisites of a valid
2-702(2) "demand"' 55
 have been met, this demand may by itself be
sufficient to give the seller a full 2-702 right to the goods.'" This sec-
tion will first discuss the effect of such a reclamation if the trustee
proceeds under any of the three Bankruptcy Act provisions (sections
70(c), 67c, and 64(a) ) discussed in the preceding section. Then it will
examine the seller's 'prospects if the trustee utilizes two other Bank-
ruptcy Act sections specifically directed toward the pre-bankruptcy
time period, sections 60 and 70(e). In all cases, the discussion will as-
sume that the seller has taken whatever steps are necessary to obtain a
full 2-702(2) right to the goods.
A. Sections 70(c), 67c and 64(a)
Critical to the success of the seller's reclamation under these
bankruptcy provisions is the contention that the trustee's rights to the
goods under each section are ascertained as of the date of the bank-
ruptcy. Under section 70(c) the trustee is to have the rights and pow-
ers of an "ideal lien creditor"'" "as of the date of bankruptcy."'"
Thus, if the 2-702(2) reclamation (or demand) is deemed to re-vest
129-30 supra, the 1938 Bankruptcy Act excluded state priorities from § 64a, so that a
creditor now claiming under a state-created priority is relegated to the position of a
general creditor. See 3A COLLIER, supra note 3, 11 64.01 at 2053-54. The changes did
remove the validity of state created priorities under the Bankruptcy Act, so that it is ar-
guable that such priorities were invalidated, despite the presence of specific language in
the statute to that effect.
'" See text at notes 201-02, 232 infra.
'" See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
158 See In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1971), which held that
a 2-702(2) demand made before the date of bankruptcy was sufficient to enable the sell-
ler to triumph over the trustee, where the actual physical transfer of the goods from
the buyer to the seller occurred after bankruPtcy. I n so holding, the court stated that
"Wile statutory demand and the legal right to possession, not actual physical possession
of the goods in question, govern the seller's rights" and that °[t]he 'transfer' here oc-
curred ... prior to the date of bankruptcy and we must determine [the seller's] legal
rights as of that date." Id. at 1211.
187
	 notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
158 11	 § 110(c) (1970).
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title in the seller prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings,
the buyer would lack title "as of the date of bankruptcy," and the
trustee as the "ideal lien creditor" of section 70(c) would effectively
have nothing to. attach.' 59 One case, in dictum, seems to support this
view of the matter'"
The impact of a pre-bankruptcy reclamation on the trustee's
rights under section 67c is less certain, since the section does not
specifically refer to the time at which the trustee's power takes
effect.'" Several general statements by courts and commentators have
been made to the effect that section 67c operates only as of the time
1 " However, the trustee may be able to utilize the rights of an actual lien creditor
under § 67a(1). See Braucher, supra note 3, at 1292. Section 67a(1), 11 U.S.C. §
107(a)(1) (1970), grants the trustee the right to avoid liens obtained by attachment,
judgment, levy or other legal or equitable process or proceeding within four months
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy if at the time such lien was obtained such
person was insolvent. Thus, if subsequent to delivery of the goods an actual creditor of
the buyer obtains a judicial lien (for example, by levy) within four months of bank-
ruptcy, then the trustee may avoid that lien. In addition, under § 67a(3), 11 U.S.C. §
107(a)(3) (1970), the trustee could then preserve the lien for the benefit of the estate,
and thereby gain whatever rights the judicial lien creditor had. In the case of a reclaim-
ing seller, the trustee would prevail over the seller to the extent of the judicial lien.
Thus, the availability of §§ 67a(1) and (3) to displace the reclaiming seller depends not
only upon a creditor obtaining a levy upon the goods in what may be a very short time period
but also upon whether the law of the particular state provides for the superiority of the
judicial lien. To the extent that a § 67a lien holder can he equated with a lien creditor, this
should depend upon which version of § 2-702 is in force, the effect given the 1966 amend-
ment, and which view of the cross-references in section 2-702 is adopted by the courts. See
generally notes 68-99 supra and accompanying text. But in those states where a judicial lien
creditor is superior to the reclaiming seller, § 67a could be useful to a trustee who cannot rely
upon §70(c) because the reclamation had been effected prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.
However, it has been suggested that section 67a may only apply to liens attaching
to property to which the trustee succeeds under section 70(a), 110 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1970), which grants the trustee the title of the bankrupt as of the date of bankruptcy.
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 3, 1 67.03 at 66.2. If so, and if (as discussed in the text), the
seller regains full title to the goods by reclaiming before bankruptcy, then § 67a would
not be of help to a trustee either.
16° In In re Beliring	 Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (deci-
sion of bankrupty referee), where a bare oral demand was made within ten days of the
receipt of the goods and before the date of bankruptcy, the court held that some sort
of "follow-up" was necessary to activate the right of reclamation. Id. at 606. In consid-
ering whether the reclamation petition made by the seller (after the date of bankruptcy)
might constitute such a "follow-up," the referee stated: "If the filing of the petition for
reclamation in this proceeding be considered to be the follow up of the previous effort
at reclamation, then bankruptcy having intervened the question arises whether the right
of reclamation was cut off by the trustee under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act." Id.
The court then went on to decide that the right was cut off through the operation of
section 2-702(3). Id. at 606-07. See note 97 supra and accompanying text. The clear im-
plication of the quoted language, however, is that had there been an adequate follow-
up (or, more generally, a sufficient demand) before bankruptcy, the seller would have
triumphed. This is reinforced by the court's statement that lilt could be argued that
the petition for reclamation Would relate back to the time of the oral demand and
hence would antedate the cut off right of the trustee." Id. at 607.
181 See 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970).
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of the filing of the petition.'" However, in In re Federal's, Inc. the
court declared that under section 67c(1)(A) the right to reclaim under
section 2-702(2) was "unenforceable in bankruptcy."'" Although the
case concerned a reclamation after bankruptcy, the basic principle
that section 2-702(2) has no effect in bankruptcy could he extended to
the area of pre-bankruptcy reclamation. In effect the trustee would
have to argue that section 2-702(2) was so contrary to the intent of
section 67c(1)(A), that this policy consideration should overcome any
implied requirement that the property be part of the bankrupt's estate
when the petition is filed.
The trustee's utilization of section 64(a) to invalidate the 2-702(2)
reclamation as a state-created priority would seem to depend upon his
possession of title to the goods at the time of the reclamation, since it
is difficult to see how he could establish priorities as regards goods to
which he lacks title. However, section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act
gives the trustee only "the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the
filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title," 64 and
here, of course, the seller has obtained a complete right to the goods
before this petition. Thus, unless the trustee can invalidate the
2-702(2) reclamation by utilizing one of the other bankruptcy sections
discussed here, he should be precluded from employing section 64(a)
in the context of a pre-bankruptcy reclamation.
B. Sections 60 and 70(e)
This article has so far dealt with those provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act—sections 64(a), 67c and 70c—which are primarily con-
cerned with the trustee's title to the estate of the bankrupt. Generally,
these interests of the trustee take effect as of the date of bankruptcy.
However, the trustee needs to have additional powers to invalidate
transfers of property that occur prior to the filing of the petition in
which the purpose is to create a "preference" for the creditor. With-
out such a power, the debtor could transfer his property to selected
creditors before the petition and thereby deny any recovery to other
less favored creditors. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Act has empow-
ered the trustee to invalidate certain pre-bankruptcy transfers in
order to Facilitate an equitable distribution of assets.'" These transfer
provisions are relevant to a pre-bankruptcy reclamation, since the
trustee may claim that such an action by the seller is an invalid trans-
fer.
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 See 4 COLLIER, supra note 3, 1 (17.27 at 373. See also Coggin v. Division of
Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118, 124-27 (1949). The Coggin case, however, in-
volved the transfer to the trustee after bankruptcy of property previously subject to a
perfected government tax lien and previously in the possession of the government.
' 63
 402 F. Supp. at - 1368. See note 132 supra.
1 " 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). Cf: 3A Col.i.int,supra note 3, if 64.02[7] at 2075-76,
"6 See 3 Coutimsupra note 3, 1 60.01 at 743-44.
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1. Section 60
Section 60(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act defines a preference as:
a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of
a debtor to or For the benefit of a creditor for or on ac-
count of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such
debtor while insolvent and within four months before the
filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceed-
ing under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than some other creditor of the same class.'"
Under subsection (b) "such preferences may be avoided by the trustee
if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby ... has, at the
time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent."'" Such an avoidance empowers the trustee to re-
cover the property from the seller.
.Some of the elements of a preference—e.g., the fact of a "trans-
ter .... to or for the benefit of the creditor,"'" the insolvency of the
debtor at the time of the transfer;' 69 the four month time period; and
the effect of giving the creditor a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same classm—have not constituted major
points of disagreement in litigation between the seller and the trustee.
166 11	 § 96(a)(1) (1970). For a schematic statement of the basic elements of
a preference, see 3 CoctiER,supra note 3, 1  60.02 at 758-61.
"7
 11 U.S.C.	 96()) (1970). It is interesting to note that the "discovery of the
buyer's insolvency" requirement of § 2-702(2) may result in satisfaction of the "reason-
able cause to believe" requirement of * 60(b). Although the latter standard is of course
objective and the former is not, proof of the former may often effectively amount to
proof of the latter.
"" In terms of defining a transfer § 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act states:
'Transfer' shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct
or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest
therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or
upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or in-
voluntarily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, as-
signment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gill, security, or
otherwise; the retention of a security title to property delivered to a debtor
shall be deemed a transfer suffered by such debtor ....
11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970). Even a simple 2-702(2) demand, if sufficient to give the seller a full
right to goods, should meet this requirement.
The Bankruptcy Act defines a "creditor" as inducting "anyone who owns a debt, de-
mand, or claim provable in bankruptcy ...." 11 U.S.C. § 1(11) (1970). An unpaid credit seller
would seem easily to qualify under this definition, and a return of the property to him would
obviously be for his benefit.
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 Either the Uniform Commercial Code or the Bankruptcy Act definition of insol-
vency would apply to this situation. See note 102 supra.
""Creditors who in the absence of a preference would he entitled to the same percen-
tage of their claims are considered members of the same class for purposes of § 6(1. See 3
COLLIER, supra note 3, 1 00.34 at 905. Here, absent a tight to reclaim, the credit sae!' would
clearly be in the general creditor category, and would obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than other general creditors if' he did physically repossess the goods.
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However, the "property of the debtor" and the "antecedent debt"
elements of a preference are not as easily resolved in a reclamation.
Before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code these two ele-
ments did not present major problems of interpretation. Under the
common law a reclaiming credit seller who could prove fraud was able
to retain the goods as against the trustee by rescinding the contract,'"
The re-vesting of the buyer's voidable title in the seller was said to
preclude the buyer from obtaining an interest in the goods sufficient
to render them his "property"" 2 or to preclude a diminution of the
bankrupt's estate.'" But, in non-fraud cases, reclamation by a credit
seller seems to have been regarded as preferential. 174 Also, several
courts have stated that any extension of credit, no matter how brief,
makes a transfer "for or on account of an antecedent debt" under sec-
tion 60(a)(1). 15 In effect, under the common law a reclamation for
fraud would be a transfer for an antecedent debt, but would not be a
transfer of the debtor's property. Hence, the seller could avoid the in-
validation of the transfer under section 60.
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, with its de-
emphasis of the title concept,' 7 6 and the uncertain relationship of sec-
tion 2-702(2) to common law fraud have changed certain aspects of
this picture considerably. Although there seems to have been no litiga-
tion on this point, some Code commentators have expressed the view
that, while a 2-702 reclamation might technically fulfill the elements
of a preference under section 60(a), nonetheless it should not be so
treated.'" The principal reason for this seems to be the characteriza-
tion of section 2-702 as basically a re-enactment of the common law
remedy of rescission for fraud. This argument is often pressed with
special vigor as regards the relationship of the common law to the
"written misrepresentation" language of section 2-702(2)." 8
 However,
a" See note 18 ,cupro and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g., Fisher v. Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159, 161 (D. Mass. 1925); Mul-
roney Mfg. Co. v. Weeks, 185 Iowa 714, 718, 171 N.W. 36, 38 (1919). See also Lowell v.
Brown, 280 F. 193, 198 (II Mass. 1922),
'" See, e.g., Kamberg v. Springfield Nat'l Bank, 293 Mass. 24, 26-27, 199 N.E. 339, 341
(1935). See also 3 Cott:it:Rot/pm note 3, 1 60.18, 60.24.
174 See Marks v. Goodyear Rubber Sundries, Inc., 238 F.2d 533, 534 (2d Cir. 1956).
This would presumably be based on the complete shill of title to the buyer in a non-Inuid
credit sale, and the consequent transfer of the buyer's "property" by repossession.
'" See, e.g., Engelkes v. Farmers Co-Operative Co., 194 F. Supp. 319, 324 (N.D. Iowa
1961), Here, the "antecedent debt" fer which the transfer would be made would derive from
the seller's extension of credit to the buyer.
See U.C.C. § 2-101 comment..
'"See King-Voidable Preferences, .supra note 3, at 939-40; Note, 79 HARv. L. Rtx.,,supra
note 3, at 612.
jTh See King-Voidable Preferences, supra note 3, at 939-40. Professor King argues:
If reclamation under section 2-702(2) is treated as preferential sim-
ply because there is no need to show fraud where the claim is made within
ten days of delivery, an artificial distinction will be created between the
two rights specified in the section. Where the seller demands reclamation
within ten days, it will be treated as preferential; if a written misrepresen-
tation has been made to the seller, the reclamation will not be treated as
637
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
as previously noted,' 79 this characterization of section 2-702(2) as a
codification of the common law right of rescission is anything but certain.
This uncertainty is increased if one refers to the title provisions of the
Code which stand in direct contrast to the voidable title theory of the
common law.
Section 2-401 of the U.C.C. provides that "[elach provision of this
Article with regard to the rights, obligations and remedies of the sel-
ler ... applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the pro-
vision refers to such title." Comment 1 to this section, however, states
an additional instance in which considerations of "title" may be rele-
vant: where the "applicability of 'public' regulation depends upon a
'sale' or upon location of 'title' without further definition ... [i]t is ...
necessary to state what a 'sale' is and when title passes under this Arti-
cle in case the courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the
defined term of the 'private' law."'" Section 2-401 does specify the
times at which "title" will be deemed to "pass" when such considera-
tions become relevant 181 II f the Bankruptcy Act is viewed as a "public
regulation," the definition of the term "property of the debtor" in sec-
tion 60(a) might well be regulated by the rule stated in Comment 1 to
section 2-401. Under this approach section 2-702, which does not ex-
pressly mention "title," might be regarded as irrelevant to such defini-
tion. If so, by the terms of section 2-401(2), title generally passes upon
the completion of the seller's performance with respect to the goods.
Thus, the goods upon delivery would be the buyer's "property," and
the subsequent reclamation by the seller would involve a "transfer of
the property of a debtor." Assuming all of the other elements of a
voidable preference are met, this self-contained Code approach could
render a 2-702(2) reclamation a voidable preference under section 60
of the Bankruptcy Act, irrespective of its purported status as a re-
enactment of the common law fraud remedy. However, the outcome
is unclear at present, since the result depends upon the court's charac-
terization of section 2-702(2). If the court views the section as primar-
ily a codification of the common law, the voidable title concept applies
and the goods transferred would not be part of the debtor's property.
If the court confines itself to the title provisions of the Code the op-
posite result would be achieved.
preferential. The solution to the problem is to extend the pre-Code cases
to cover both the non-fraud and written misrepresentation cases of section
2-702(2) by refusing to characterize reclamations as voidable preferences.
Id. Of course, this general argument could work against his basic position, since a could
also be argued that section 2-702's de-emphasis of fraud could be extended to the "writ-
ten misrepresentation" provisions so as to characterize the entire section as a voidable
preference.
"° See notes 48-56 supra and accompanying text.
18° U.C.C. § 2-401, Comment I.
181 See U.C.C. §§ 2 -401(1) -(3).
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2. Section 70(e)
A trustee unable to utilize the Bankruptcy Act sections previ-
ously discussed might turn to section 70(e)'" to defeat a credit seller
reclaiming under section 2-702(2). Although to date no trustee seems
to have utilized this section, its availability has been suggested.'" Sec-
tion 70(e)( I) provides:
A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a
debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this title which, under
any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as
against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of
the debtor, having a claim provable under this title, shall be
null and void as against the trustee of such debtor.'"
The applicability of section 70(e) in the context of 2-702 raises at least
three issues. The first relates to what type of creditor would be able to
avoid the section 2-702 reclamation. Second, can the trustee utilize the
avoidance rights of these types of creditors? Finally, if the trustee can
use 70(e), to what extent can he avoid the reclamation right Of the sell-
er?
It would seem that a general creditor, who by definition does
not have an interest in specific property, would not have any power to
avoid a section 2-702 reclamation, so the trustee would need to locate
an actual 185 secured creditor or actual lien creditor. Since a creditor
with a perfected Article 9 security interest in after-acquired property
is deemed a good faith purchaser for value under the Codem and
the seller's reclamation right is made expressly subject to a good faith
purchaser by section 2-702(3), the secured party could avoid the rec-
lamation. This result has been reached by a number of courts in deny-
ing the seller's reclamation petition as against secured creditors.'"
1 d 2 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1970).
"'See Braucher, supra note 3, at 1292; Countryman, supra note 3, at 458.
1 " 11 U.S.C.	 I 1 0(e)( 1) (1970),
"5 See 4A COLL] ER, sUpra note 3,	 70.90[1] at 1029-30.
"'See U.C.C. § 1-201(19), 1-201(32) 1-201(33), 1-201(44); In re Daley, Inc., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 433, 435 (D. Mass. 1975). An alternative approach is that since: (I)
section 2-403(1) empowers a purchaser (the debtor) with voidable title to transfer good
title to a good faith purchaser for value, (i.e., the secured creditor); (2) title passes to
the secured creditor at the latest, in the absence of a contrary agreement, upon delivery
to the buyer/debtor under section 2-401; and (3) if the section 2-702(2) reclamation
right is deemed to render the debtor's title voidable, then the creditor's security interest
would be superior to the seller's reclamation right. See In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1107, 1110-12 (I). Mass. 1967) (decision of bankruptcy referee);
Countryman, supra. note 3, at 447. 458.
"7 See In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U,C.C. Rep. Serv. 1107, 1110-12 (D. Mass.
1967) (decision of bankruptcy referee); In re Daley, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv, 433, 435
(D. Mass. 1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge) and the cases cited therein. One court
refused to reach this result because of the failure of the secured party to show good
faith. In re American Food Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 436, 441-44 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
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The second type of creditor who could possibly avoid the seller's rec-
lamation right is a creditor who obtained a lien on the goods after
their delivery in a state giving such lien creditors priority over the
seller.'"
The resolution of whether the trustee can use the claim of a se-
cured creditor or a lien creditor would seem to depend upon whether
the claim of such a creditor is provable. Despite the fact that the
claims of such creditors meet the literal requirements enunciated
under the Bankruptcy Act to establish a provable claim,'" Professor
Kennedy has argued strenuously that the trustee should not be al-
lowed to use the claim of a secured or lien creditor unless the trustee
could himself avoid that creditor's claim.'" If given an expansive in-
terpretation, section 70(e) can be used by the trustee to invalidate a
security interest which "runs counter to the uniform construction" of
the Bankruptcy Act."' This issue has not yet been definitively re-
solved by the courts.' "2
The final issue is also clouded by some uncertainty. Once the
trustee locates au actual creditor with a right to avoid the seller's rec-
lamation, the doctrine of Moore v. Boy 1 "3 comes into play. This case
has come to mean that the trustee's rights derived from an actual
creditor's power of avoidance are not limited to the amount of that.
creditor's claim." " 4 Consequently, for example, if the creditor had a
claim to the extent of only $100, the trustee could avoid a seller's
right of reclamation even though the goods were worth $10,000. This
doctrine has been sharply criticized 1"5 but may still have current vital-
ity. Thus, it would seem that an avoidance under section 70(e) is pos-
sible unless the courts are persuaded that the trustee can only succeed
to the rights of a lien creditor or secured creditor if the trustee can
avoid that lien or security interest.
3. Summary
Due to the absence of applicable case law, any conclusions re-
garding reclamation before bankruptcy are necessarily tentative. If the
seller is able to effect a reclamation of the goods prior to the filing,
1118 See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
'" 11	 § 103(a) (1970). See 4A COLLIER, supra note 3. 1 70.90 at 1034-35.
"" See Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 Mtei L. REV. 1419 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Kennedy, The Trustee in
Bankruptcy]. In the case of a lien creditor, this would require that the trustee be able to use §
67a to avoid the lien. See note 159 supra.
lac Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy, supra note 190, at 1430.
' 92 See WitrrE, SU MMERS.supra note 3, at 891,
j" 284 U.S. 4 (1931),
1" See Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy, supra note 190, at 1421. Professor
Kennedy notes that the result of Moore "contravenes it fundamental attribute of
subrogation—that the person subrogated acquires no greater rights than those of the
person to whose position he is subrogated." Id.
195 1d. at 1420-24.
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section 70(c) would seem to be inoperative since the reclamation
would probably be viewed as revesting title in the seller before the
date of bankruptcy. In like fashion, section 64 should not apply. The
outcome under 67c(1) is less certain and depends upon whether the
section serves as a general invalidation of section 2-702 or only oper-
ates upon liens not enforced as of the date of bankruptcy. The pre-
bankruptcy reclamation of the goods also brings into play two addi-
tional sections of the Bankruptcy Act, which are directed at pre-
bankruptcy transfers. It is conceivable that the reclamation could be
avoided by the trustee as a voidable preference under section 60 unless
section 2-702 is viewed as a re-enactment of the common law remedy
for Fraud and internal Code solutions regarding passage of title are
eschewed. Finally, avoidance under section 70(e) is a distinct possibil-
ity, but depends upon the existence of certain types of actual cred-
itors.
Once again the characterization of section 2-702 is highly deter-
minative of the seller's success vis-a-vis the trustee.' 96 If the section is
considered to be a statutory lien, it may be avoided by the trustee
under section 67(a) or 70(e). 197 If section 2-702 is deemed a security
interest, then the reclamation could serve as a repossession perfecting
that interest.'" This delayed perfection may well be a voidable pre-
ference under section 60 as well as subject to avoidance under section
70(e).'"" If the section 2-702(2) reclamation right is considered as bas-
ically a codification of the common law remedy of rescission for
fraud, the seller would win under section 60 unless the internal Code
argument utilizing section 2-401 is accepted. Under section 70(e) this
characterization should not be too significant, for reasons given above
with respect to section 70(c). 2"
As noted previously,'" when the trustee prevails a problem
arises as to whether the exclusivity provision of section 2-702(2) is in-
validated. If the trustee prevails tinder section 67c or 64(a), the court
will have invalidated section 2-702(2) as a statutory lien or state-
created priority. If the court further finds that the exclusivity provi-
"" For sections 70(c), 67(a), it is the lime of the reclamation, and not the characteriza-
tion, which is crucial here. The differential effect oldie characterization should not produce
a result different from the discussion in the text at notes 136-41 supra.
14 This could occur only if an actual Article 9 secured party or lien creditor per-
fects or attaches during the interim between sale and repossession. As for § 60, this
would depend on whether a statutory lien enfOrced before bankruptcy is a preference.
However, § 67h of the Bankruptcy Act validates in bankruptcy all statutory liens not in-
validated by other provisions of § 67c, irrespective of the operation of § 60. 11 U.S.C. §
107(b) (1970). In effect, the status of statutory liens in bankruptcy is determined by §
67, and not by § 60.
"" U.C.C. § 9-305.
" See notes 260-63 infra and accompanying text. The avoidance under § 70(e)
could occur only if an actual Article 9 secured party or lien creditor perfects or attaches
during the interim between sale and repossession.
2 " See text at note 141 .supra.
2" See notes 142-54 supra.
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sion of section 2-702(2) is invalidated, the seller will then be able to
utilize the common law remedy of rescission for fraud. However, if
the trustee prevails under the transfer provisions of section 60 or
70(e), there is possibly no invalidation of section 2-702(2). Unlike sec-
dons 64(a) and 67c, sections 60 and 70(e) do not address themselves
to the invalidation of the statute involved. Instead they deal with the
transfer of goods. Hence the application of section 60 or 70(e) would
invalidate the transfer under section 2-702(2), but might not reach the
other terms in that provision. In that event the exclusivity provision
would be left intact and would prevent the seller from utilizing the
common law remedies. 2 "2
I V. CASH SALE
Assuming an inability to recover under U.C.C. section 2-702(2)
by demanding the goods either before or after bankruptcy, the credit
seller might be forced back yet another hypothetical step in time in
order to protect his interest in the property. Under section 2-702(1),
the seller "may refuse delivery except for cash" where he "discovers
the buyer to be insolvent." Following such a refusal, the rights of the
seller upon the buyer's failure to pay apparently are governed by sec-
tion 2-507(2) of the Code, which provides: "Where payment is due
and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of
title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of them is condi-
tional upon his making the payment due." Despite the absence of ex-
press language to this effect, this section has been read as providing
the cash seller with a right of reclamation if payment is not made,263
this right arising either implicitly,204 or__by the apparent conjunction of
section 2-507(2) with section 2-702(2). 245
 Whatever its genesis, this
2" This would be based upon the approach taken in In re Federal's, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 1153, that the exclusivity was invalidated as part of a general invalidation
of the section in bankruptcy. See note 144 supra. Under the reasoning of In re Wetson
the remedy provided by 2-702 remains exclusive only so long as it survives attack by the
trustee. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 429. In the event that the section does not survive, the
seller is permitted recourse to pre-Code remedies. This language seems broad enough
to include an attack by the trustee under § 60 or § 70(e). See text at note 147 supra.
203 In an actual sale for "cash" as such, of course, the seller usually would not
part with the goods until he received payment. Thus, the typical instance in which a
failure to pay gives rise to the need for reclamation is where a check is given in pay-
ment and is subsequently dishonored. U.C.C. § 2-511(3) states that "payment by check
is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due
presentment." Comment 4 to this section states that "[tlhis Article recognizes that the
taking of a seemingly solvent party's check is commercially normal and proper and, if
due diligence is exercised in collection, is not to be penalized in any way."
2" See In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968); In
re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See also Ranchers & Farmers Live-
stock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d '313, 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
'See In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384 (N.D. Ind. 1975)
(decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746.
748-49 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-07 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge); Greater
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2-507(2) reclamation right clearly does involve at least one section
2-702(2) restriction. Comment 3 to section 2-507(2) states that "[t]he
provision of this Article [section 2-702(2)] for a ten day limit within
which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent
buyer is also applicable here," and several cases have held that such a
ten day limit clearly does apply. 20" Comment 3 also provides a "follow
up" requirement analogous to that suggested for section 2-702(2) 257
by stating that the failure of the seller to follow up his rights" waives
the conditional nature of the buyer's right to retain or dispose of the
property. 20" Finally, some cases have implied that the "written misrep-
resentation" exception to the ten clay demand limitation under section
2-702(2) 2 " also applies in the cash sale context. 2 "
Assuming that the reclaiming 2-507(2) seller survives these pro-
cedural hurdles, however, his right to the goods as against the trustee
in bankruptcy is still quite unclear. Generally, his ability to recover is
likely to depend upon the characterization of the origin of the section
2-507(2) reclamation right. At common law, title was not deemed to
pass until payment was made for the goods in a cash sale. 2 " Thus,
the cash seller had a right of replevin or trover2 " as to unpaid-for
goods, and could recover them from both lien creditors of the buyer
and the trustee in bankruptcy. 212 The cases suggesting that section
2-507(2) creates an inherent or implicit reclamation right seemingly
independent of section 2-702(2) also hold that the cash seller's rights
are superior to those of the trustee, and seem to do so on something
akin to the "common law" basis. 2 "
Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, '20 (Ky. 1965). This
conjunction arises in part from Comment 3 to § 2-507. See note 39 supra.
"'See cases cited in note 205 supra.
2" See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
"' in re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 1 7.2d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1974)
seems to be the only case discussing this requirement under §§ 2-507 and 2-702(2), and
it speaks only of "a regaining of possession or a bona fide attempt to do so." Id. at
1121.
2" See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
2 " See, e.g., In re Bar-Wood, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (deci-
sion of bankruptcy judge); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 106-08
(S.D. Iowa 1973) (decision of bankruptcy judge).
2'1
	 e.g., Gilmore, supra note 15, at 1060; 77 C.J.S. Sales § 262, at 1060-62
(1952).
212 See, e.g., Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 142, 67 A. 45, 46 (1907); Gilmore, supra
note 15, at 1059; 77 C.J.S. Replevin §§42-47 (1952); 78 C.J.S. Sales * 417 (1952). See also
Sparkman v. Brown, 42 Ga. App. 335, 156 S.E. 240 (1930).
413 See, e.g., Voi.o. supra note 14, § 30, at 170-72. See also Engelkes v. Farmers
Co-Operative Co., 194 F. Supp. 319, 324 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
2 " See in re Mort, 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D, Pa. 1962); In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (decision of bankruptcy referee). The court in In
re Mort relied on the language of U.C.C. § '2-511, Comment 4 which states that "[this
Article recognizes that the taking of a seemingly solvent party's check is commercially
normal and proper and, if due diligence is exercised in collection, is nut to be penalized
in any way." The court went on to state that "[a] businessman in financial difficulty must
be able to carry on cash transactions or go out of business altogether. Unless we are to
return to primative commercial methods, such a businessman should be able to use a
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However, this common law "cash sale doctrine" has come under
attack in various 2-507(2) cases. The Code's general disavowal of the
title concept has caused some courts to declare the old doctrine re-
garding the passage of title in a cash sale to be inapplicable to section
2-507(2). 2 ' 5 It has also been stated that section 2-507(2) determines
only the rights of parties to the sale, and not those of the seller and
third parties. 2 " More importantly, however, some cases have ex-
pressly subordinated a cash seller to a trustee through the operation
of sections 2-702(3) and 9-301(3). 217 These courts have reasoned that
since sections 2-507(2) and 2-702(2) are related, a cash seller should
also be subject to the limitations of section 2-702(3) which subordi-
nates a credit seller's rights to those of a lien creditor. Since a bank-
ruptcy trustee is a lien creditor under section 9-301(3), the trustee
should prevail over a reclaiming cash seller. This line of reasoning of
course depends on the presence of the "lien creditor" language in sec-
tion 2-702(3), and also on a somewhat controversial view as to its
impact. 2 " It should be further noted that if this Line of reasoning
were accepted, it would seem to guarantee victory for the trustee in
all bankruptcy contexts, since the seller's subordination to the trustee
(who is a lien creditor by section 9-301(3) ) would be effected totally
within the confines of the Uniform , Commercial Code. 2 "
Altermitively, however, it might be argued that section 2-403 of
the Code, which subordinates the cash seller to a good faith purchaser
for value, and not section 2-702(3), should govern the relative rights
check for payment." 208 F. Supp. at 310-11. The court held that the seller could re-
claim under § 2-507, that "[niothing in the Bankruptcy Act changes this," and that "if
the seller has a right to reclaim the goods lie stands in a position superior to any creditor."Id.
at 310. See also In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845.46 (W.D. Va. 1968),
distinguishing Mort but seemingly willing to find for the cash seller in an appropriate case.
"5
 See, e.g., Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 365.66, 421 P.2d 978,
980 (1966).
" 6 See, e.g., id. at 369-70, 421 P.2d at 982.
2 " See In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (N.D. Ind.
1975) (decision of bankruptcy judge); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
746, 749 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (decision of bankruptcy judge). See also Greater Louisville
Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 1965), where the ap-
plicability of section 2-702(3) to the reclamation rights of a cash seller was discussed, but
where it was concluded that the third party was neither a good faith purchaser nor a
lien creditor, In both Richardson Homes and Kirk Kabinets the courts stated that the seller
would have to perfect a security interest in the goods to triumph against the trustee.
Richardson Homes, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 387; Kirk Kabinets, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at
749.
21K See notes 88-99 supra and accompanying text. In the event, however, that the
Kravitz view (i.e., a look to common law to discover the relative rights of seller and lien
creditor) on this matter were accepted, the seller would typically triumph, since a cash
seller typically could recover over a lien creditor before the advent of the Code. See
note 213 supra and accompanying text.
21 " However, Kravitz, which also discussed section 9-301(3), seemed to reject this
conclusion, probably because of the court's view that section 2-702(3) spoke only of the
rights of a lien creditor, these rights not being adequately defined by the Code. 278 F.2d
at 821-22. See notes 76-87 supra and accompanying text.
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of the cash seller and third parties. 22 ° The basis for this argument
would be that 2-702 only applies to credit sales while cash sales are
governed by sections 2-507 and 2-403. 221 But even this approach pre-
sents difficulties for the cash seller. One "cash sale" case, In re
Samuels, 2" has suggested that a lien creditor could be regarded as a
good faith purchaser under section 2-403(1)(c), 223 The court noted
that under U.C.C. section 1-201(32) a purchaser may be one who
takes by lien and under section 2-403(1) a good faith purchaser may
acquire title to goods which were obtained from a purchaser in a
prior transaction who had issued a check which is later clishonored. 224
However, it is doubtful that a trustee in bankruptcy could be termed a
good faith purchaser for value. The definition of the term "purchase"
in U.C.C. section 1-201(32), while including a taking by lien, also
speaks of "any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in
property."225 It is difficult to see how the trustee's lien, which under
section 9-301(3) is acquired by "attachment, levy or the like," could be
considered "voluntary." Finally, the whole controversy regarding the
relative rights of a reclaiming credit seller and a trustee claiming as an
ideal lien creditor under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act becomes
meaningless if a lien creditor is assumed to be a good faith purchaser
for value. In fact, the inclusion of the terms "good faith purchaser"
and "lien creditor" in the pre-1966 versions of U.C.C. section 2-702(3)
"" U.C.C. § 2-403 provides in relevant part:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had
or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest ac-
quires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with
voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser
for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of pur-
chase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the
purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later
dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale,"
or
(d)the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lieu creditors are
govertted by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers
(Article 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7).
The reader should note that under If 2-403(4) the rights of a lien creditor are
governed by Article Nine.
221 See U.G.C. § 2.507, Comment 3.
222 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), rey'd sub nom. Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100
(1974), modified, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd en bone, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1976), dot denied sub nom. Stowers v. Mallon, 97 S. Ct. 98 (1976). It is the final Santueth
opinion at the circuit court level which is of concern here, and all subsequent citations
will be to this opinion.
22: In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (5th Cir. 1976).
224 Id.
225 U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (emphasis added).
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strongly suggest that the drafters of the Code saw a basic difference
between them. 228
The In re Samuels court also found that the 2-507(2) reclamation
right is a security interest. 227
 This right, if unperfected, would clearly
be subordinate to that of a lien creditor by section 9-301(1)(b) of the
Code. Once again, then, the trustee's 70(c) status should enable him to
triumph. This argument, to say the least, is controversial since there is
no specific reference in the Code to the status of 2-507 under Article
9. However, the alternative contention that the cash seller's priorities
should be governed solely by section 2-403 is perhaps equally con-
troversial. Since the courts have not resolved whether section 2-403 or
Article 9 should apply, either argument would appear to be plausible.
Most of the preceding discussion has involved the relative rights
of seller and trustee with respect to the trustee's rights as lien creditor
under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. However, the argument
that the cash seller should be subordinated to the trustee solely by
means of U.C.C. sections 2-702(3) and 9-301(3) seems to operate with-
out reference to any particular Bankruptcy Act provision, and, if ac-
cepted, would result in the automatic subordination of the seller to
the trustee in all of the bankruptcy contexts discussed. But, as previ-
ously noted,228
 this argument is itself quite uncertain since the rights
of a lien creditor are not adequately defined by the Code. Thus, it is
quite possible that the rights of the reclaiming cash seller might vary
with the particular Bankruptcy Act provision utilized by the trustee. If
he utilizes section 60 claiming a preference or 64 claiming a state
created priority, resolution of the problem would seem to depend On
226 It could be argued that this distinction is outweighed by the policy of the
Bankruptcy Act to give the trustee the powers of an ideal lien creditor. See note 69
supra. However, the actual rights of the trustee as lien creditor are determined by state
law. Hence, the approach of the Code should predominate to frustrate any claim that
the trustee is a good faith purchaser for value.
2"
 526 F.2d at 1247-48. There, the court found that U.C.C. sections 2-401(1)
and 1-201(37), which provide that any retention or reservation by the seller of property
or title to the goods sold is limited in effect to reservation of a security interest, lead to
the conclusion that the 2-507(2) right must be a security interest. Id. at 1246-47. How-
ever, Comment 1 to section 9-113 of the Code, which governs so-called Article 2 se-
curity interests, does not mention section 2-507 in its listing of sections'creating such in-
terests. (However, it has been suggested that while not mentioned in Comment I to sec-
tion 9.113) the 2.702(1) right to refuse delivery except for cash is a security interest.
Wli l'I'E & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 780-81.) Moreover, as has been seen, the section
2-702(2) reclamation right has often been held not to be a security interest. See note 59
supra and accompanying text. Further, another case has squarely held that section
2-507(2) does not create a security interest. See Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado
Springs Nat'l. Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 175, 519 1).2d 354, 359 (1974). See generally
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 836-39. Finally, even if the 2-507(2) right is regarded as a
security interest, it is possible that in the context of a dishonored check, the buyer may
he deemed to have "riot lawfully obtained possession of the goods" under section 9-113
of the Code. If so, the "security interest" would be enforceable without Article 9 perfec-
tion and the rights of the secured party would be governed by Article 2. U.C.C.
9-113(a), (c). See Henson, supra note 3, at 49-50.
226 See note 219 supra.
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whether a "title" analysis is deemed applicable to section 2-507(2),
since both depend for their operation on the bankrupt buyer's having
had title to the goods at some time. 229 As for section 67c and its re-
strictions on statutory liens, it is not obvious that the 2-507(2) reclama-
tion right, whatever its relationship with section 2-702(2), could be re-
garded as "solely statutory," since it could easily be seen as a codifica-
tion of the common law right of replevin in a cash sale.'" If the trus-
tee claims under section 70(e) that he can assume the right of a cred-
itor who could avoid a section 2-702(2) reclamation, the question is
likely to depend on whether there exists an actual party with a per-
fected Article 9 security interest in the goods. If so, the trustee should
triumph because of the secured party's status as a good faith pur-
chaser for value and the subordination of a cash seller to such a party
under section 2-403(1)(c) of the Code. 2 ° Finally, it should be noted
that if the seller is able to effect demand before bankruptcy his
chances of success, as was the case in the credit sale context, should
sharply improve. This is, however, subject to the possiblity of an avoi-
dance under section 70(e), if the trustee can locate a prior creditor.
If a court were to rule that section 2-507 is invalid under a
trustee's section 64(a) or 67c claims, the seller may attempt to resort to
common law remedies. In response the trustee could argue that since
Comment 3 to section 2-507 states that the ten day reclamation provi-
sion of section 2-702(2) is applicable to 2-507 reclatnations, then the
exclusivity provision of 2-702(2) should also apply. This argument
may prove faulty since there is no specific language in 2-507 which
dictates this result. In addition the common law cash sale doctrine is
distinguishable from a credit sale situation in that fraud or misrep-
resentation was not necessary element. 292 If the buyer merely failed
to make payment when due, then the seller could reclaim the goods,
since the buyer never received any title. Hence, the cash seller may be
able to utilize the common law, if the trustee is successful in denying
the seller's claim under section 2-507.
V. STOPPAGE IN TRANSIT AND WITHHOLDING OF DELIVERY
The seller may find that the reclamation provisions of sections
2-507 and 2-702 do not provide adequate protection of his interests
when he is dealing with a marginally solvent buyer. Therefore, the
seller may wish to take certain precautions prior to delivery, such as
stoppage in transit and withholding of' delivery. Section 2-702(1) pro-
229 See notes 169, 172.81 supra and surrounding text. For a suggestion that "tide"
and the 2-507(2) right to retain or dispose of goods are distinct concepts, see Ranchers
& Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. Ct.. App. 1976).
230 notes 211-14 supra and accompanying text. However, for a suggestion that
the cash sale reclamation right might be invalidated by section 67c, see Henson, supra
note 3, at 53-54.
x3
`See notes 182-92 supra and accompanying text.
432 See Gilmore, supra note 15, at 1060.
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vides the seller with several alternatives upon discovering the insol-
vency of the buyer, one of which is to stop delivery. Section 2-705
governs the seller's right to stop the goods in transit and provides in
relevant part:
(1) The seller may stop delivery of goods in the pos-
session of a carrier or other bailee when he discovers the
buyer to be insolvent (section 2-702) ...
(2) As against such buyer the seller may stop delivery
until
(a) receipt of the goods by the buyer; or
(h) .acknowledgement to the buyer by any bailee of the
goods except a carrier that the bailee holds the goods for
the buyer ....
One commentator has suggested that the second limitation in section
2-705(2)(h) represents an expansion of the right of stoppage as it ex-
isted under the Uniform Sales Act, wherein it was limited to the
period during which the goods were in transit and ended upon their
coming into the possession of another bailee. 233 In any event, it is a
very limited right since it depends upon the seller not only discover-
ing the insolvency but also notifying the carrier within what typically
will be a brief time period.'"
The right of a seller to retain the goods after a successful stop-
page in transit under pre-Code law has been recognized by bank-
ruptcy courts even when the buyer went into bankruptcy before or
during transit. 235 Moreover, a case decided by the Tenth Circuit
under the Code has arrived at a decision consistent with the pre-Code
cases: that a timely exercise of stoppage in transit under sections
2-702 and 2-705 precludes the debtor from having possession or con-
structive possession of the goods and therefore renders them not the
property of the debtor. 236 To date, stoppage in transit properly ac-
complished has remained immune from the attack of trustees. This
result is appropriate, for the right in effect should be classified as a
security interest.'" As Comment 1 to section 9-113 points out the
233 See 3A DUESENIWRG & KING, supra note 3, § 13.04[ 11 at 13-50. This observa-
tion is based  upon a comparison of § 2-705 with Uniform Sales Act §§ 57-59 (1950). See
V ou), supra note 14, at 264-65.
434 See 3A DittsENBERG & KING, supra note 3, § 13.0401 at 13-56-57.
234 See In re Charles T. Stork & Co., 265 F. 864, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); 4A
CoLLIER, supra note 3, if 70.40 at 481.
'See Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114, 116-17
(10th Cir, 1974).
237 U.C.C. § 9-113, Comment 1. One commentator has suggested that the right
of stoppage in transit might be considered a statutory lien. Henson, supra note 3, at 53.
The suggestion seems to have been made by way of demonstrating the absurdity of
considering § 2-702 as a statutory lien. In the unlikely event that § 2-705 were deemed
a statutory lien, the above discussion of section 67c(1)(A) where reclamation had been
effected before bankruptcy could be applicable. See notes 161-62 .supra and accompany-
ing text.
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"rights of resale and stoppage under sections 2-703, 2-705 and 2-706
... are similar to the rights of a secured party." Because this is a se-
curity interest arising solely under Article 2, and so long as the buyer
does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods, the
seller does not need a security agreement to make his interest en-
forceable nor does he need to file in order to perfect it. 2 " Thus, the
seller who successfully stops the goods in transit has a perfected
purchase money security interest (or the equivalent thereof) in the
goods. 23" Arguably, then, he should have at least the same protection
From the trustee in bankruptcy enjoyed by secured creditors whose in-
terests arise under Article 9. 24 "
Therefore, the use of stoppage in transit would seem to be a
safe, though very narrow, recourse for a seller who discovers that the
buyer is insolvent. Through the use of this device, the seller retains all
of the rights of a seller who has never given up possession."' If the
seller is fortunate enough to discover the insolvency of the buyer
while still in possession of the goods, he can spare himself the hectic
pursuit of the goods in transit by exercising another 2-702(1) right:
refusal of delivery except for cash. 242 As long as the seller maintains
possession awaiting cash payment2 " his possession of the goods
should be immune from a turnover order. 244 Thus stoppage in transit_
or refusal of delivery except for cash should prevent the trustee from
successfully claiming the rights of a lien creditor to the goods or in-
validating the transaction as a preferential-transfer.
V f. RESERVATION OF TITLE
Reliance by a seller upon stoppage in transit or withholding of
delivery is precarious at best, and hinges upon an expeditious response
to the discovery of the buyer's insolvency. Consequently, a seller
might be tempted to plan ahead by incorporating into the sales
agreement a retention or reservation of title as a means of providing
added protection against a default in payment by the buyer. This ap-
proach, however, will not help the seller if the buyer comes into pos-
session of the goods, because section 2-401(1) states that. lalny
333
 U.C.C. §§ 9-113, 9-302, 9-305.
U.C.C. 9-107; P. CoocAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER [HE UNWORN! CONIM•RCIAL CODE, § 18.02[3][c] at 1888 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as ComAN, HoGAN & VAGTs].
"" For example, a perfected purchase money security interest is superior to a
lien creditor by virtue of § 9-301(2). Thus, the trustee could not defeat the seller who
successfully stops delivery of the goods in transit by use of the lien creditor provisions
in § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act. See notes 256-64 infra and accompanying text.
211 See 3A DuEsENtsmo: & KING, s upra note 3. § 13.031:3] at 13-11.
2" Id.	 13.03[2] at 13-10.
"3
 The cash sale discussion in the previous section dealt with the situation where
the seller failed to maintain possession awaiting cash payment. See note 203 supra and
accompanying text.
"4 See 3A DIASENBERG Se KING, supra note 3, § 13.03[2] at 13-12 to 13-13.
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don or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation
of a security interest." This triggers section 9-113 which provides cer-
tain exceptions to the perfection and default provisions of Article 9 so
long as the debtor (buyer) does not have or does not lawfully obtain
possession of the goods. 245 Thus, as soon as the seller delivers the
goods to the buyer his rights will be governed entirely by Article 9
and under section 9-301(1)(b) his unperfected security interest will be
subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor. In other words, the seller
must acquire a purchase money security interest by obtaining a se-
curity agreement and perfecting it pursuant to the provisions of Arti-
cle 9 in order to defeat the trustee.
VII. ARTICLE 9 SECURITY INTEREST
The most certain course of action for the seller to protect his in-
terests from the claims of the trustee is to obtain a perfected Article 9
security interest. In fact, in several of the cases where the 2-702 re-
claiming seller emerged vanquished, the judge added insult to injury
by admonishing the seller to follow the simple expedient of perfect-
ing a security interest. 248 The chief drawback to such an approach is
that a security interest cannot be accomplished by the unilateral action
of the seller—the debtor's signature is required. 247 Still, given the
obstacle-strewn path of a seller attempting to reclaim under sections
2-702(2) or 2-507 or the requisite diligence of stoppage in transit, the
effort involved in obtaining a signed security agreement would seem
well rewarded.
If the seller does obtain a security interest it would be classified
as a purchase money security interest because it would be "taken or
retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price." 248 In order for the seller's security interest to attach; i.e., to be
enforceable against. the debtor: 1) there must be 71 security agreement
signed by the debtor; 2) value must be given by the creditor; and 3)
the debtor must have rights in the collateral. 24 •
In addition to having a security interest enforceable against the
debtor, the seller is particularly interested in protection against third
445 If the buyer uses fraudulent means to obtain the goods, such as a had check,.
he would not lawfully obtain possession of the goods. See note 227 supra.
240 In re Samuels, 526 F.2d at 1248; id. at 1248-49 (Gee, J., concurring); In
re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep Serv. 384, 387 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (decision
of bankruptcy judge).
247 U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
U.C.C. § 9-107.
' U.C.C. §§ 9-203(I), (2). These requirements present few interpretative prob-
lems in the purchase money security interest context with the possible exception of
when the debtor has rights in the collateral. Article 9 does not explicitly state when a
debtor-buyer acquires rights in the collateral, but this may occur upon identification of
the goods to the contract. 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 239, § 4.06 at 311-14.
In any event the buyer should have rights at the latest when he gains possession.
650
THE RECLAIMING SELLER AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
party claimants (including a trustee in bankruptcy). 25° This can be ac-
complished by perfecting the security interest, which in the context of
a purchase money security interest entails filing 2" a financing state-
ment in the appropriate place. 252
 The security interest is deemed to
be perfected once it has attached to the property and all the applica-
ble steps for perfection have taken placc. 2" If the seller perfects his
purchase money security interest within 10 days after non - inventory col-
lateral comes into possession of the debtor, his interests will have
priority over conflicting security interests in the same collateral and
lien creditors. 25 "
The seller should be assured secured status in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding if he perfects his interest within the allowed time period, even
if this occurs after bankruptcy. 255
 However, there are some
problems258
 that can arise from a seller's deviating from the pre-
scribed ritual, one of which deserves mention here because of the
likelihood of its occurring in our present context. If the credit seller
becomes apprehensive about the ability of the debtor to pay for goods
already delivered and then obtains a signed security agreement from
the debtor, he will encounter problems if the debtor goes into bank-
ruptcy. If the perfection of this interest occurs after the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy (and after any grace period), 257
 then the trus-
tee should defeat the security interest by virtue of his status as a
hypothetical lien creditor who has priority under section 9-301(1). 258
25 " See Winn: & SlitNIEKS, supra note 3, at 796 ("[A]n unperfected secured party
will invariably have to eat from the general creditors' trough in bankruptcy.")
251
 Filing is necessary to perfect, except for purchase money security interests in
consumer goods. U.C.C. § 9-302(1). U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c) (1966 version) also contained
an exemption for farm equipment nut having a purchase price in excess of $2,500. See
§§ 9-109(1). (2) for a definition of farm equipinent and consumer goods.
252 The appropriate place depends upon the type of collateral and which alterna-
tive of § 9-401( I) (i.e. local or central filing) has been adopted in a jurisdiction.
253 U.C.C. § 9-303(1). However, care should be taken when the property deli-
vered by the seller is to become part of the buyer's inventory as defined under §
9-109(4). Often times a debtor will have signed an after-acquired security agreement
which attaches to certain property which the debtor acquires at a later date. U.C.C. §
9-204. Section 9-312(3) provides rules of priority when the seller's purchase money se-
curity interest in inventory may conflict with an after-acquired property interest. To
maintain priority the seller must perfect his purchase money security interest by the
time the buyer receives possession and notify any prior secured party with a perfected
security interest in the same type of inventory. Consequently, the seller must diligently
seek out prior secured parties, notify them of his security interest and perfect before
turning over possession to the buyer. if he does not, his interest will be subordinate to
the conflicting security interest and perhaps lose out completely to a trustee tinder §
70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act. See notes 182-95 suprrr and accompanying text.
2 " U.C.C. §§ 9-312(4), 9-301(2).
255 See King
-Voidable Preferences, supra note 3 at 932; Winn & Summits, supra
note 3, at 874.
256
 For a detailed discussion of the problem of voidable preferenCes and Article 9
security interest, see King-Voidable Preferences, supra note 3.
457 See id. at 931 -33.
258
 ThiS is because the trustee has the status of all ideal lien creditor as of the
date of bankruptcy. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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In this case, the seller would actually have a greater chance of success
by effectively exercising his 2-702(2) reclamation right. 259
On the other hand, if the seller perfects any time prior to the fil-
ing of the petition, the trustee will not succeed under section 70(c) but
will proceed to attack the security interest as a voidable preference
under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. The requirements of this sec-
tion are legion, as has been discussed above. 29" The first of these is to
determine whether there has been a transfer for the benefit of a cred-
itor. Since the Bankruptcy Act does define a transfer to include the
granting of a security interest this first requirement is satisfied."' A
second reqUirement is that the seller had reasonable cause to believe
that the debtor was insolvent at the time of transfer. This should pre-
sent few problems for the trustee, since under the hypothetical situa-
tion discussed herein in the credit seller perfected the security interest
due to fears that the buyer was insolvent. Similarly, the four month
requirement poses a simple question of fact. Finally, the requirement
of showing an antecedent debt will be met if the seller has already de-
livered the goods to the buyer and then creates and perfects the se-
curity interest. 2 C 2
 In addition, such a seller may be defeated by the
trustee's stepping into the shoes of an actual lien creditor or secured
creditor with priority over the seller's security interest by means of
section 70(e). 2"" This provision would probably be used by a trustee
only if section 60 were unavailable.
Consequently, the most certain and best advised course is for the
seller to obtain a security agreement signed by the debtor and to file a
financing statement within the prescribed time after the debtor comes
into possession of the goods. However, a seller who delivers the goods
to the buyer and then seeks added protection beyond section 2-702 by
compliance with the requirements of Article 9 will probably be disap-
pointed by the operation of section 70(c) or 60. 294
VIII. CONCLUSION
From the above, it is apparent that the seller's safest course is to
obtain a security interest in the goods and diligently to perfect. The
strategies of withholding delivery and stoppage in transit, while likely
to be effective where utilizable, do not lend themselves to planning.
Further, a mere reservation of title is of no assistance once the seller
2" Comment 5 to § 9-113 states that "a seller who reserves a security interest by
agreement dues nut lose his rights under the Sales Article, but rights other than those
conferred by the Sales Article depend on full compliance with this Article."
2" See notes 165-81 supra and accompanying text.
2fil I I U.S.C.	 1(30) (1970). This seciiou is quoted at note 168 supra.
262 See WiirrE& SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 874. See also U.C.C. § 0-108.
263 See notes 182-95 supra and accompanying text.
2"a
	 availability of section 70(e) to defeat Article 9 security interests has been
questioned persuasively by Professor Kennedy. See Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy,
supra note 190.
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relinquishes possession. The cash sale may offer some protection (al-
though the legal situation here is extremely unclear), but is also less
than satisfactory because it is not a planning device. Similarly, a
seller's reliance upon section 2-702 seems misplaced in many jurisdic-
dons, because of the array of much-litigated Bankruptcy Act provi-
sions which the trustee can bring to bear. Even with the added proba-
bility of success that a demand before bankruptcy might provide in
this context, it is difficult for a seller to monitor the solvency of his
buyer, and often the seller only discovers the insolvency via the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. if other courts adopt the view that sellers, whose
reclamation right under section 2-702 is invalid or unenforceable in
bankruptcy, may pursue pre-Code remedies for fraud, then conceiv-
ably obtaining a written (mis)-representation of solvency in accordance
with the requirements of 2-702 and/or the common law fraud re-
quirements of his state could increase the liklihood that the 2-702 rec-
lamation will withstand the trustee's assault.
Given this situation, perhaps the ideal solution is to vie for the
best of both worlds by obtaining a perfected Article 9 security interest
and the remedies of that Article, while at the same time pursuing the
section 2-702 reclamation right upon discovery of the buyer's. insol-
vency, thereby gaining the opportunity to enjoy the remedies of Arti-
cle 2. 255 The basic advantage of a successful 2-702 reclamation over a
claim based on the Article 9 interest is that the expense, risk, and ju-
dicial scrutiny of a foreclosure sale is avoided. 21" Furthermore, recla-
mation would be especially advantageous where the goods have ap-
preciated in value, since the reclaiming seller is under no obligation to
account to the buyer for any surplus over the contract price realized
in a resale. 2"' On the other hand, if the resale of the goods would
realize less than the contract price, and there are sonic assets in the
bankrupt's estate remaining for distribution to the general creditors,
then the seller could proceed as a secured creditor, recovering some
of the deficit from the resale. The full success of this two-pronged
strategy depends on a degree of foresight, time, care and (sometimes)
luck often inconsistent with the conditions under which credit sellers
must operate. As a result, the flow of litigation—and attendant legal
confusion—in this area is likely to continue for the Foreseeable future.
2" See Benfield, Rights of . a Sellers Assignee to Reclaim Goods Under the U.C.C., 53
TEx, L. REV. 1, 9 (1974) for a discussion of this possibility. Comment 5 to § 9-113 per-
mits this outcome. See note 259 supra.
"" U.C.C. § 9-504 requires a commercially reasonable resale and an accounting
of the proceeds.
"7 LLC.C. § 2-706(6).
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